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 As the British mandate in Palestine ended in mid-May 1948, responsibility for the 
territory shifted to the newly-formed United Nations. With tensions between Zionist settler Jews 
and Indigenous Arab Palestinians at an apex, the international organization sought to engender 
peace by implementing an internationalization of the Holy City of Jerusalem and its environs. 
This MA thesis examines the United Nations’ vision of internationalization and the supranational 
sovereignty it imagined for itself over Jerusalem, as well as local Palestinian, Jordanian, and 
Israeli residents within the city. Notwithstanding the creation of a commission, local 
consultations, international conferences, and two draft statutes, the UN plan to internationalize 
the area encompassing the Holy City failed by the mid-1950s. This examination reveals that the 
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Only Pleasing Themselves:  
The United Nations’ Internationalization of Jerusalem, 1947-54  
 
The plan was not working. Despite numerous attempts by the United Nations to 
internationalize the city of Jerusalem, the urban center remained out of the organization’s grasp.1 
As its Trusteeship Council drafted a statute for the Holy City, Iraq’s Muhammad Fadhel al-
Jamali cautioned the international organization. UN efforts, al-Jamali warned, were problematic, 
as they were “based upon [the] assumption to seek new solutions acceptable to occupying 
powers.”2 While not speaking for Palestinians, he critiqued the Western-centered premise that 
undergirded UN involvement and outlined its ramifications as seen by a decolonizing Arab 
world. al-Jamali feared the United Nations acted as a bedfellow of Zionism, the political arm of 
the Israeli state, and that such an alliance proved to be detrimental for peace in the Mashriq.3 The 
tireless efforts of UN officials to enforce the General Assembly’s mediation ideal in 
Israel/Palestine, he declared, “tried [to] please all groups but none [are] pleased.”4    
But, in this case, even the occupying powers were dissatisfied. Surprisingly perhaps, 
Israel’s Moshe Sharett agreed in principle with the Iraqi permanent representative. Iraq and Israel 
remained at war with each other with no armistice in place following the first Arab-Israeli war of 
1947-49. Having witnessed three years of indecisiveness and incompetence, Sharett was fed up 
with UN efforts. In its most recent iteration, the United Nations replaced the Palestine 
 
1 While “internationalize” and “internationalization” are rather clunky terms, I employ them because that was the 
language the United Nations used in discussions at the time.  
2 Incoming Cablegram, 6 January 1950, from Geneva, Switzerland, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, United 
Nations Archives [cited hereafter as UNA]. 
3 “Can United Nations Force Statute?” Mideast Mirror, 16 April 1950. Page 8. “Mashriq” is the Arabic word for 
“East,” which designates the eastern part of the Arab world and encompasses the region known in Eurocentric 
geographic nomenclature as the “Middle East.” 







Conciliation Commission (PCC) with the Trusteeship Council as it struggled to control day-to-
day life in the Holy City. Initial Israeli support for the UN internationalization plan slowly ebbed 
out of fashion as failure after failure gripped its proclaimed peace initiative. Israel’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs summed up his opinions bluntly in a May 1950 report to the Trusteeship 
Council. Should the United Nations continue to press its agenda, Sharett warned, “the city is to 
become like a diver whose air line is cut.”5  
 Sharett and al-Jamali reached similar conclusions concerning the UN plan to make 
Jerusalem a permanent international zone rather than a part of the partition of British Palestine 
between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The plan had significant flaws, and the newest installment 
was more continuity than reconstruction.6 What the United Nations missed, or more precisely 
ignored, was rather important: in the existing international system, anchored in the gradual 
universalization of the Westphalian nation-state model, the supranational body had no legal right 
to place Jerusalem under its administration.7 Legal sovereignty concerning Jerusalem was in flux 
following the transfer of the League of Nations-sanctioned mandate over Palestine from Britain 
to the United Nations in mid-1947.8 Despite occupying roles as the mandatory power over 
Palestine since 1922, none of the supervising authorities formally held legal sovereignty over the 
Holy City.9 Territorial sovereignty, in the planned case of an internationalized Jerusalem, 
 
5 Draft of Memorandum to be Presented by the Government of Israel to the Seventh Session, United Nations 
Trusteeship Council on the Question of Jerusalem, May 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, UNA. 
6 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 10. 
7 Legal Opinions, Undated, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, UNA. 
8 League of Nations Mandate for Palestine (12 August 1922), Nineteenth Session of the Council, Thirteenth 
Meeting, Held at St. James’ Palace, London. See also: Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 199. 
9 Henry Cattan, “The Status of Jerusalem under International Law and United Nations Resolutions,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies Vol. 10, No. 3 (1981): 8-9; and Dieter Grimm, translated by Belinda Cooper, Sovereignty: The 






belonged to the United Nations; Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians in the Holy City would be 
the direct subjects of UN authority, headquartered in Lake Success, New York. Municipal 
sovereignty, in other words, would rest with the international organization, not its member 
nation-states, let alone non-members.10 The proposed internationalization of Jerusalem, under the 
auspices of a supranational organization in the late 1940s and early 1950s, perpetuated the 
disenfranchisement of local self-determinations and represented an imperial challenge to the 
nationalization of sovereignties deeply embedded in an emerging era of global decolonization.11  
This thesis examines the United Nations’ attempt to internationalize Jerusalem from its 
decision to partition Palestine until its abandonment of the “Jerusalem question” in the early 
1950s. Passed in late November 1947, UN General Assembly Resolution 181 infamously 
partitioned Palestine between non-Palestinians. Understandably, emphasis has been 
predominantly placed on its call to establish two separate “Arab” and “Jewish” zones in the 
region. What often falls of out sight, however, is that Resolution 181 also partitioned a third part 
of Palestine to the United Nations. This forgotten portion called for the creation of an indefinite 
“international” zone, a corpus seperatum (separated body), in and around Jerusalem and the 
surrounding Holy Sites, to be governed by UN officialdom.12 The United Nations’ mandate, as 
per Resolution 181, and its subsequent official belief viewed the separation of Jerusalem from 
Israel and Jordan (the state that governed and claimed sovereignty over the West Bank), let alone 
Palestinians, as an important dimension in establishing a so-called everlasting peace in 
 
10 Despite the central role of Israel, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt in the discussions around Jerusalem, all four nations 
became UN members at different times, if at all. Egypt was an initial member in 1945; Israel received Member 
status in 1949 after many deliberations; and Transjordan did not receive official status until 1955. Palestine has 
never received Member status.  
11 Christopher J. Bickerton, “State-Building: Exporting State Failure,” in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Conliffe 
and Alexander Gourevich, eds. Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations 
(London: University College London Press, 2007), 96. 






Palestine/Israel. Corpus seperatum, in this case, entailed that the United Nations appoint its own 
governor, provide “law and order,” and guarantee protection of the Holy Places, among other 
responsibilities.13 Rather than being a temporary occupying power as UN member states had 
been in places like Germany and Korea in the wake of World War II, the internationalization 
plan rendered the United Nations as the pseudo-municipal sovereign with no expiration date. 
When it came to Jerusalem, this particular arrangement did not please Palestinians, Israelis, or 
other neighboring non-Palestinian Arabs. This thesis argues that, during the period under study, 
it only pleased UN officials. 
By focusing on the details and subsequent failure of the United Nations’ so-called 
internationalization of Jerusalem, the thesis makes two key contributions. First, a detailed 
examination of the formal planning of a corpus seperatum in the area of Jerusalem adds to the 
scholarly demystification that the United Nations was a global body above empire-making 
during its early existence.14 Although the signing of the United Nations Charter in the autumn of 
1945 was heralded by its adherents as a liberatory moment of change to the international order, 
the Charter’s vague terminology and theoretical tensions provided ample space for imperial ways 
of being to continue.15 According to contemporary international law, sovereignty—that is, the 
authority to govern—rested with the government controlling a defined territory. As part of a 
partitioned space and under an UN-invented process of internationalization, Jerusalem 
 
13 The Protection of the City of Jerusalem and its Inhabitants, 20 May 1948, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0005, 
UNA. 
14 Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2018), 178. For further examples of the early United Nations, see: John Quigley, The International 
Diplomacy of Israel’s Founders: Deception at the United Nations in the Quest for Palestine (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016); and Ellen Jenny Ravndal, “‘The First Major Test’: The UN Secretary-General and the 
Palestine Problem, 1947-9,” The International History Review Vol. 38, No. 1 (2016): 198-199.  
15 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 190; Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the 





represented something relatively unseen in modern-era global affairs: a defined land under the 
direct and persistent sovereignty of a supranational body, rather than one or many of its 
members.16 Put simply, the United Nations would control Jerusalem without any right to do so.  
This thesis utilizes the concepts “imperial” and “colonial” to signify two interrelated—
yet importantly distinct—modes of domination. “Imperial” signifies a way of being that 
buttresses empire’s structure of human inequality in the world. Individuals, groups, governments, 
and organizations—like the United Nations—are imperial by thinking, speaking, behaving, and 
interacting in ways that dehumanize, exploit, disregard, and disable for self-serving political, 
social, economic, and cultural benefits.17 Broadly speaking, “imperial” ways of being invoke and 
exceptionalize ideas of human difference—based on categories of analysis like race, gender, 
class, and sexuality—to empower oneself and downgrade the manufactured “other” in a 
relational way.18 In short, imperial ways of being promote, enhance, and foster difference to 
further demarcate the categorization of those with power and those without.   
“Imperial” ways of being differ from the concept of “colonial” as being “imperial” does 
not require a formal relationship between “colonizer” and “colonized” determined by territorial 
control and political subjugation. “Imperial” differences are invoked in both formal and informal 
 
16 The only other instance of UN tinkering in international sovereignty affairs at this juncture was in Trieste in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II, although the global disparity of importance between the two cities should not 
go unnoted. Danzig was declared an autonomous region with help of the League of Nations following World War I 
and the Treaty of Versailles’ recommendation, again without the same gusto pursued in relation to Jerusalem. For 
examples of these moments, see: Glenda Sluga, The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, 
Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 143; 
Elizabeth M. Clark, “Borderland of the Mind: The Free City of Danzig and the Sovereignty Question,” German 
Politics and Society Vol. 35, No 2 (2017): 25-26; and Ralph Wilde, “From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The 
Role of International Territorial Administration,” The American Journal of International Law Vol. 95, No. 3 (2001): 
602-605. What’s more, Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations at this time, compared Jerusalem to 
Trieste in response to “further strengthening of the United Nations.” Trygve Lie, “Introduction to the Third Annual 
Report, 5 July 1948,” in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds. Public Papers of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Volume I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 156.  
17 Robert H.J. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001): 27. 





situations accompanying a relational structure of empire and its diverse political, social, 
economic, and cultural operations of imperialism.19 “Colonial,” for its part, is a particular kind of 
imperial mode of oppression anchored in the formal conquest and administration of foreign 
lands.20 Settler colonialism, as in the case of Zionism, represents a distinct subset of “colonial” 
because its practice both conquers foreign lands and seeks to eliminate the latter’s Indigenous 
population while simultaneously aiming to “indigenize” the settler population.21 In service to a 
greater structure of empire, “colonial” operations dispossess colonized peoples without the 
genocidal intentions of settler colonialism. In this thesis, I characterize the United Nations as 
“imperial” when it historically acted in ways that brokered inequalities between the international 
organization and Jerusalemites that empowered the former in the domains of foreign relations 
and international politics. Conversely, the United Nations was “colonial” when it sought to 
directly administer the territorial space in and around the city of Jerusalem, control the local 
population, and subjugate Jerusalemites to its political authority via disenfranchisement. 
The terms “local” and “sovereignty” are two other crucial components in need of 
clarification.  “Local,” for the context of this thesis, refers to communities in and around the 
municipality of Jerusalem. Arab, Palestinian, and non-settler Jewish and Christian peoples fall 
under this umbrella of “local.” The word is used in contrast to the internationalism inherent in 
the United Nations—both in practice and action in Jerusalem—as well as to demarcate the gulf 
between a global project and its smaller, more regional impact in the areas surrounding the Holy 
City. “Local,” then, is an antonym to the global found at the United Nations. The other term is 
 
19 Ibid., 1349. 
20 Young, Postcolonialism, 21. 
21 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research Vol. 8, No. 
4 (2006): 388 and 401; and Lorenzo Veracini, “The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation,” 





“sovereignty,” which runs through this thesis as a pseudo-synonym for governance, or the right 
to govern the city of Jerusalem. By referring to “sovereignty,” I evoke tensions between global 
and local as the first attempted to assume control over the second without legitimate consent. UN 
commissions, such as the PCC, artificially created the structures of governance (or in this case, 
attempted to create) to artificially install a desired sovereignty fitting its mandate.22 The friction 
between acceptable and desired control played out through questions of legitimate sovereignty 
between aspirant local governing bodies and equally-aspirant imperially-minded non-local 
entities, such as the United Nations.23 By defying local sovereignty, the United Nations, under 
the direction of “colonizer” member states like the United States, Soviet Union, France, and 
Britain, engaged in imperial actions. These four terms—imperial, colonial, local, and 
sovereignty—are therefore interconnected and crucial for understanding how the United Nations 
operated in Jerusalem.  
Despite a lack of UN involvement in international territorial administration prior to 
Jerusalem, there were antecedent attempts globally for such governmental structures. European 
colonial powers had previously fueled ideas of so-called internationalization, even if 
unsuccessful, to enforce a regime upon a region without much consent from local populations. 
The island of Crete was governed by six European powers from 1897-1898, primarily to squash 
jealously and frenetic land-grabs in the wake of the Ottoman empire’s military defeats.24 A 
border dispute between Colombia and Peru led to a three-member commission governing the 
region of Leticia in 1932, but the town of barely 3,000 people was returned to Colombia the 
 
22 Lori Allen, “Determining Emotions and the Burden of Proof in Investigative Commissions to Palestine,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 59, No. 2 (2017): 393.  
23 Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1370. 
24 Méir Ydit, Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin” (Leyden: 
A.W. Sythoff, 1961), 28. This “Board of Ambassadors” consisted of Austro-Hungary, France, Germany, Great 





following year.25 Pre-UN internationalization efforts attempted to mitigate still-rampant colonial 
aspirations and promote a putative peace amongst Western imperial nations.26 
Internationalization, then, was the prerogative of Western countries to prevent further conflicts 
between each other, rather than the stated desires of local peoples in the internationalized zones.  
The United Nations, against the “principle of equal rights and self-determination” 
outlined in its Charter, established itself as “a force for world order” from the onset.27 Its 
proclaimed reform of the international system coincided with the gradual disintegration of a 
Western imperial system based on formal rule over overseas colonies, alongside the perceived 
dangers of independence movements and global decolonization more broadly.28 National 
struggles for liberation in Palestine and elsewhere became increasingly internationalized, as the 
UN General Assembly became the main stage where the status of colonized territories was 
scrutinized. A litany of quandaries surrounding the issue of sovereignty, such as the role of a 
local population in determining how a country, region, or city should be run, became l’ordre du 
jour at the United Nations.29 Committed in principle to phasing out imperial rule everywhere 
around the globe, UN initiatives took on the responsibility of overseeing “transfers of power” in 
between imperial metropoles and colonies.30 The United Nations’ caretaker role in such 
decolonizing processes of in-between-ness granted it an imagined supranational authority 
 
25 Ibid., 61-62. This League of Nations initiative included of a member from Brazil, Spain, and the United States.  
26 Antony Anghie, “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate 
System of the League of Nations,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics Vol. 34, No. 2 
(2002): 515.  
27 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. San Francisco, California. Article 1; and Article 77, Point A; and 
Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 64-65. 
28 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, 99. 
29 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, 60; Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1378 and 1381; and Bickerton, 
Politics without Sovereignty, 96. 
30 “Transfer of power” is a trope of decolonization used to describe the perceived unilateral progression of empire’s 
end. This misconception was held into the 1990s in scholarship surrounding decolonization. For a critique of the 
idea, see Yoav Di-Capua, “Arab Existentialism: A Lost Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization,” 





subjected to the will of the sum of its membership parts.31 As the case study of the 
internationalization of Jerusalem reveals, imperial cooperation amid leading member states 
overpowered the international organization’s proclaimed commitment to the principle of self-
determination.32  
The Eurocentrism of both international law and the concept of sovereignty facilitated 
imperial continuity both at the United Nations and in Jerusalem in the late 1940s. Despite a 
change in name and structure, the carryover from the League of Nations to the United Nations 
was vast, especially early in the latter’s tenure.33 Based on the British imperial model, the League 
of Nations’ sanctioned mandate system served as the natural and logical basis for the United 
Nations to work from.34 The League created mandates to act as a new form of imperialism 
contorted around the growing language of self-determination powered by national liberation 
movements in colonies, and the United Nations adapted this into the Trusteeship Council to 
continue broadcasting an image of benevolence.35  
From its onset, the United Nations stood behind the mandate system in Palestine. 
According to the UN, the imperial way of being in Palestine was not the problem, but rather the 
British empire’s inadequacy and coercion were to blame for the lack of sustained peace.36 What 
 
31 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 102. 
32 Ðura Ninčić, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 126; and Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, 100 and 178.   
33 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, 21, 71, and 81; and Jessica Lynne Pearson, “Defending Empire at the 
United Nations: The Politics of International Colonial Oversight in the Era of Decolonization,” The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History Vol. 45, No. 3 (2017): 528. 
34 Leland M. Goodrich, “From League of Nations to United Nations,” International Organization Vol. 1, No. 1 
(1947): 20; Francis B. Sayre, “Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System,” The American 
Journal of International Law Vol. 42, No. 2 (1948): 265; Pedersen, The Guardians, 357; and Anghie, The Making of 
International Law, 199.  
35 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, 10 and 62; and Pedersen, The Guardians, 393.  
36 Noura Erakat, “The UN Statehood Bid: Palestine’s Flirtation with Multilateralism,” in Karim Makdisi and Vijay 
Prashad, eds. Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World (Oakland: University of California 





remained following Palestine’s shift from Britain to the United Nations in 1947, therefore, was 
an imperial notion of tutelage.37 Under the guise of assistance and in the language of hopeful 
eventualities, the UN operated with “domination that masqueraded as trusteeship.”38 The legacy 
of imperial tutelage, I argue, is exemplified in the United Nations’ failed attempt to 
internationalize the city of Jerusalem and its environs.  
This thesis’s second main contribution reveals how early UN actions in Jerusalem helped 
lay the flawed foundations scaffolding the so-called peace process between Arabs and Jews in 
the Mashriq. By way of problematizing the United Nations’ concept of internationalization, it 
adds to a growing body of scholarship critiquing the historical peace process between 
Palestinians, Israelis, and Arabs—devised, led, and mediated by Western actors—as being 
unsound.39 By meddling with multi-national sovereignties and contradicting its commitment to 
the idea of self-determination so vital to its own Charter, the United Nations managed to not only 
fail in internationalizing Jerusalem, but it also sowed formidable distrust with Israel, Palestinian 
leadership, Jordan, and other Arab countries.40 Thereafter, the international organization was not 
viewed as a legitimate mediator in the peace processes in part because of its imperial approach to 
the Jerusalem area during the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Early UN involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts unearths the 
problematic nature of the historical peace process. The botched partition plan, rendered moot 
nearly from its inception, transformed the United Nations from a body of aspirant policy-formers 
 
37 Anghie, The Making of International Law, 116. 
38 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, 82; and Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1373. 
39 Seth Anziska, Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018); Nasser H. Aruri, Dishonest Broker: The U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine (Boston: South End Press, 
2003); Rashad Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2013); and Salim Yaqub, Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.—Middle East Relations in the 
1970s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016). 
40 Andrew Gilmour, “The Role of the UN Secretary-General: A Historical Assessment,” in Makdisi and Prashad, 





to an assortment of administrators scrambling for some semblance of peace.41 As the United 
Nations looked to gain control, it set the peace process on a tainted track. A major part of the 
issue, I argue, was that the United Nations considered the conflict between Arabs and Jews as a 
matter of conciliation, not reconciliation. The idea of conciliation in UN imaginations implied 
that the involved factions never peacefully coexisted, and that conflict was inevitable or even 
unavoidable.42 With the introduction of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, a peacemaking 
and pacification pursuit, the United Nations was not actively striving toward a reunion of the two 
sides, at least not in name. Through the process of partition, the United Nations enforced a form 
of conflict resolution which had not yielded many positive results prior, and has been met with 
historical contempt since.43  
The failed UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem was indeed a case of reconciliation, 
rather than conciliation, because it unfolded in a context whereby those involved sought to 
reconcile pre-existing political and cultural differences, even if there was no tangible acceptance 
of this previously peaceful life in Palestine by the United Nations. This initiative was launched in 
order to re-establish Arab-Jewish relations to an age of coexistence, predating the European-
constructed ideology of Zionism, its arrival in Palestine, and the Arab resistance against 
dispossessions and forced relocations.44 That said, this historical case study is a unique form of 
reconciliation, as the established ways of approaching the topic have been through re-righting the 
wrongs of national programs such as Residential Schools in Canada or Apartheid in South 
 
41 Arie M. Dubnov and Laura Robson, “Drawing the Line, Writing Beyond It: Toward a Transnational History of 
Partitions,” in Arie M. Dubnov and Laura Robson, eds. Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century 
Territorial Separatism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 13.  
42 Michelle U. Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); and Ussama Makdisi, Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and 
the Making of the Modern Arab World (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), 3-6. 
43 Dubnov and Robson, Partitions, 27. 





Africa.45 These have been well-established, cognizant, and clearly-stated historical re-righting 
objectives from governmental bodies in charge, which the United Nations efforts were not. And 
yet the overall goal—that of a return to peace in Palestine—is indeed a reconciliatory effort akin 
to the more globally recognizable examples. By writing conciliation into the commission’s name, 
however, the United Nations signalled a viewing of Palestine’s history not unlike the institutions 
that preceded it. The omission of the two-letter prefix indicated that the United Nations viewed 
its actions as a novel contribution to the region rather than a return to pre-Western intrusion 
realities in Palestine. This error in nomenclature, and in the historical viewing of Zionist-
Palestinian tensions as inevitable, ever-lasting conflicts, set a problematic course for efforts in 
Israel/Palestine to the detriment of Palestinians, Israelis, and the United Nations itself.  
 Contrary to the popular perceptions of perpetual and eternal conflict, Muslims, Jews, and 
Christians lived in relative congruity within Ottoman Palestine prior to Western encroachments. 
Religious diversity in Palestine was more a source of strength than weakness, despite established 
discriminatory practices toward non-Muslims.46 Supplemental taxation, harsher legislation, and 
the like notwithstanding, Jews and Christians practiced a reasonably high level of religious 
autonomy and local self-governance for the time under Ottoman Muslim rule.47 Yet during its 
Tanzimat reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman empire internally altered ruling 
mechanisms to better mimic the perceived progress of its European counterparts.48 Its tendency 
 
45 John E. Drabinski, “Reconciliation and Founding Wounds,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human 
Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013): 118; Marwan Darweish, Carol Rank, and Sarah 
Giles, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation: Contemporary Themes and Challenges (London: Pluto Press, 2012); and 
Bashir Bashir and Will Kymlicka, eds. The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 74-80. 
46 Makdisi, Age of Coexistence, 28. 
47 Campos, Ottoman Brothers, 9.  
48 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” The American Historical Review Vol. 107, No. 3 (2002): 779; Yelda 
Demirag, “Pan-Ideologies in the Ottoman Empire Against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism,” The 
Turkish Yearbook Vol. XXXVI (2005): 144; and Anyur Erdogan, “The Sending Students Abroad in the Period of 





toward comparative leniency fell victim to a greater Turkification of myriad non-Turkish 
cultures under the Ottoman imperial umbrella of centralization.49 Tanzimat moved cities like 
Jerusalem away from a semblance of autonomy, and instead subjected these urban centers to 
broader imperial backdrops.  
Amid its numerous centralization reforms, Tanzimat initiatives transformed the millet 
system—an eighteenth-century governing instrument applied to regions of the empire that 
functioned in essence as sovereign communities.50 While far from a beacon of acceptance, the 
millet system granted a relatively safe space for various Abrahamic denominations to live in the 
same city and to serve as intermediaries between the Ottoman metropole, its diverse subjects, 
and foreigners throughout the empire.51 With its abolishment, the late Ottoman empire promoted 
an ideology of religious pluralism that was more egalitarian while keeping unequal imperial 
relationships intact. Through this imagery of inclusivity, the non-Muslim and Arab majorities in 
Palestine joined emerging Ottoman conversations concerning imperial citizenry, which reflected 
a form of nationalism and provided distance from the prospect of secession haunting the empire 
in peripheries elsewhere.52  
A legally-binding decree known as the Status Quo uniquely governed the Ottoman area 
of Jerusalem. As noted by the United Nations in April 1949, this “modus vivendi” (a way of 
living) was created to ensure a peaceful state in the Holy Places.53 Instituted by Ottoman Sultan 
Osman III in 1757, this firman (royal decree) legislated free access to the Holy Places and its 
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vicinity to all religious denominations, local and foreign.54 Ottoman authorities reaffirmed the 
Status Quo decree in 1853 under Sultan Abdulmejid I in the wake of European imperial 
encroachments in the Holy Land.55 Attempts to circumvent Ottoman sovereignty in Jerusalem 
enforced a proliferating sentiment that the Holy City held a special international status in relation 
to other urban centers in Western imaginations. Representing the only official “international 
arrangement” concerning the Holy Places, even after the United Nations wrote corpus seperatum 
into multiple resolutions, the reaffirmation of the Status Quo in 1853 continued official policies 
of open access while simultaneously fostering greater disdain toward the Ottoman 
governmentalization of Jerusalem.56 
The advent of the Zionist movement in the waning years of the nineteenth century 
fractured the status quo in Ottoman Jerusalem. This European-based nationalist movement 
sought an exclusive homeland for Jewish peoples. Zionism rapidly set its settler colonial sights 
on the land of Palestine due to the centrality of Mount Zion and its relevance to the Jewish faith. 
For many early Zionists, the thought of having Zionism without Zion was impractical.57 Mount 
Zion, located just outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem, became a defining feature for 
the ideological, religious, and geographic legitimacy of the Western settler colonial project. By 
calling the project “Zionism” there was an intentional territorial claim to both the spirit of Mount 
Zion, and later, especially after the Balfour Declaration, to the land surrounding the religious and 
cultural space.  
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Palestine became the prime settlement location for Zionist thinkers by the turn of the 
twentieth century, despite running counter to both Ottoman sovereignty and an internationally-
established Status Quo in Jerusalem.58 Zionist disregard for the Ottoman frame of relative 
religious tolerance in Palestine engendered a culture of sectarianism and exacerbated foreign 
encroachment.59 The pluralism of Palestine’s religious realities burdened the European creators 
of the Zionist project, leading to a socially engineered “Arab” versus “Jew” dichotomy against 
the Ottoman paradigm of intercultural coexistence.60  
The Balfour Declaration, penned by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour in 
November 1917 and influenced by Zionist leadership, called for “the settlement in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people.”61 Britain’s formal support of Zionism not only opened 
Palestine to a shade of Western settler colonialism, but also thrusted Jerusalem into the role of 
the principal metropole for Zionist activities. With all other territorial considerations rendered 
contestable, Jerusalem became the center for Zionist-Jewish settlement. Despite no longer being 
under the auspices of an official empire, Palestine in the League of Nations’ mandate system 
comprised many of the same imperial ways of being had Britain ruled it as a full-fledged empire 
without international sanction. Collectively, the League, the British mandatory authority, and 
Zionists viewed Palestine and Palestinians as unfit for nationalism and in need of a Western 
brand of supposed civilizational progress.62 A Zionist Commission arriving in Jerusalem in early 
1918 remarked how the revered Old City was anything but a Holy City, simultaneously implying 
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the inferior status of Palestinian Arabs in relation to an exceptionalized status of European 
Zionist Jews.63  
Staying true to Article 22 of the League Charter, Britain saw that “the tutelage of such 
peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations.”64 As the mandate in Palestine document 
explicitly stated, and in following with the Balfour Declaration, the “Mandatory” would assist in 
establishing “a national home” for Jewish peoples centered in and around Mount Zion, while 
simultaneously promising not to harm the vague, monolithic, and prejudiced “non-Jewish” 
communities in Palestine.65 Britain and the League’s unabashed support for the Zionist 
movement signalled to Indigenous Arabs in and around Palestine that the new international 
regime had begun the processes of migration, displacement, and state-building against the desires 
of the majority of the local populations, and in direct conflict with the established status quo.66 
Settler colonialism, as a result, transformed Jerusalem into an imagined place where people 
could live in lieu of a place where people did live.67  
The Palestinian population, deeply rooted in and around Jerusalem, was left to contend 
with an unprecedented influx of European Zionist settlers attempting to uproot, displace, and 
erase from 1920 onward within an imperial British mandatory structure.68 Whereas a distinct 
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Palestinian nationalist identity was in formation during the late Ottoman period, Zionism ushered 
in a quick change of thinking and imagining of the self for Palestinian Arabs.69 With the express 
aim of creating a national home for Jewish peoples in Palestine in rapid order, Britain sought to 
control Palestinians through citizenship rather than liberation.70 The British form of citizenship 
in mandated Palestine discriminated to keep the ninety-three percent Indigenous Arab population 
from undermining the Balfour Declaration’s commitment to Zionism.71 The formation of a 
mandatory citizenship never allowed for Palestinian nationalism to be officially recognized or 
acted upon, let alone form a voice of government or self-representation. Palestinians thus lacked 
a viable arena to meet politically with the mandatory power, which severely limited the 
opportunities for any kind of official political formation relating to Palestinian identity.72 
Indigenous Arabs in Palestine self-identified as Palestinians, but the British government and 
Zionists intentionally did not view these claims as legitimate.   
 Indigenous-settler conflicts arose as a result, especially in and around Jerusalem. Deadly 
strife regularly broke out in the Holy City between 1919-1921 and again in 1929 and 1933. 
Mounting Palestinian frustrations against a growing Zionist Jewish population (which rose from 
10% in 1920 to 31% in 1936) and British imperial rule led to the Arab Revolt of 1936.73 Also 
known as the First Intifada, this moment resulted in the Peel Commission, which concluded in 
1937 that the British mandate had no future in Palestine.74 As the British position showed more 
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signs of faltering in the wake of World War II, Zionists violently targeted both British officials 
and Palestinian nationalists to cement a place in Jerusalem and Palestine more broadly. Zionist 
militants infamously bombed Jerusalem’s King David Hotel in the summer of 1946 as a part of 
this tactic. Unable to institute peace in Palestine, Britain announced its intentions to fully 
withdraw and abandon its internationally-sanctioned mandate in the region no later than 1 
October 1948.75  
As Britain retreated with “shame and humiliation,” the United Nations stepped in at the 
behest of the departing imperial power and established the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) to determine Palestine’s future.76 Unlike the Zionists, Palestinian 
leadership enacted a boycott against UNSCOP because of the perceived inevitability of an 
unfavorable outcome.77 Those Palestinians defying the national boycott met with UNSCOP in an 
unofficial manner.78 As the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, and Palestinian leadership 
anticipated, UNSCOP’s majority report suggested partition as the means to continue the 
mandatory responsibilities in Palestine.79 A majority of UN members believed the partition of 
land in Palestine, with an “internationalized” Jerusalem under UN auspices as a vital component, 
enabled both Palestinian independence and the establishment of a Jewish national home.80 The 
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United Nations, with allusions to the Ottoman Status Quo of 1757, argued that religious 
pluralism and the centrality of urban Jerusalem within the overarching peace framework justified 
corpus seperatum.81 UNSCOP also filed a dissenting minority report, tabled by India, Iran, and 
Yugoslavia, rejecting partition in favour of forming a federal state in which Indigenous 
Palestinians and Zionist settlers governed Palestine together.82 This report called for Jerusalem to 
be “the capital of the independent federal State of Palestine,” while having a United Nations-
governed body oversee the protection of and free access to the Holy Sites.83 UNSCOP committee 
members debated the extent of UN control of Jerusalem and its environs, but not the essence.84  
Overall, Palestinian Arabs rejected the corpus seperatum proposal of the majority report, 
seeing it as a loss of rights, a means of dispossession, as well as a continuation of problematic 
“elastic terms” exogenously instituted by the mandate system.85 Non-Palestinian Arabs were 
nearly unanimous in supporting an Arab state of Palestine with Jerusalem as the capital, with 
something more akin to UNSCOP’s minority report proposal without Zionist presence as the 
basis of the layout.86 Jerusalem, in Arab Mashriq eyes, was a part of the Arab world and Arabs 
were more than capable of protecting the Holy Sites.87 For Zionists, especially early in 
proceedings before Israel’s creation, the idea of UN protection over Jerusalem and the spirit of 
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corpus seperatum were not abhorrent as partition realized the establishment of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine.88 Zionists demanded that the Old City fall under the Trusteeship Council’s 
purview, which happened to be the section of the city that UNSCOP’s majority report allocated 
to an “Arab” state to be governed by a non-Palestinian Arab, King Abdullah of Transjordan.89 
Neither Palestinians, non-Palestinian Arabs, or Zionists met the UN-proposed plan of corpus 
seperatum fondly, as a continued international presence in the most coveted of urban centers 
severely limited multiple nationalisms simultaneously.  
 No study currently exists examining the plan to internationalize the city of Jerusalem 
from the perspectives of the tasked UN officials. Instead, existing scholarship tends to cite the 
same handful of secondary sources and relies primarily on the written records of the people 
involved in the PCC, with diplomats Pablo de Azcarate (UN mediator) and Walter Eytan 
(Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry) occupying primary source space rather than 
UN archival materials.90 Current historiography focuses more on describing the PCC than 
conducting a deep analysis of the so-called Jerusalem question at the United Nations.  
Given the absence of a history of the failed internationalization of Jerusalem based on 
UN archival documents, it is unsurprising that the PCC’s role as a mediating body during the 
early Arab-Israeli “peace process” has been overlooked. Only two publications have the PCC as 
their focus and neither mention Jerusalem with any real fervor. David Forsythe’s United Nation’s 
Peacemaking: Conciliation Commission for Palestine focuses primarily on the Palestinian 
refugee aspect of the commission and minimizes Jerusalem’s importance to the nascent “peace 
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process.” Internationalization is mentioned, as is the partition of the Holy City, yet Forsythe is 
much more concerned with the refugee portion of the commission.91 The other work, an article 
by Stian Johanssen Tiller and Hilde Henriksen Waage, views the PCC through the lens of the 
United States rather than the United Nations. Again, the Palestinian refugee problem occupies its 
foreground, with Jerusalem garnering a paragraph of attention in the thirty-five-page work.92 The 
article’s strength is in its description of negotiations between Zionists and Arab delegations, as 
well as the role the United States attempted—and ultimately failed—to hold throughout the PCC. 
While not explicitly stated in either of these texts, the implications of Jerusalem’s scholarly 
omittance can be chalked up to the failure of the commission itself. That Jerusalem was to be 
internationalized, and that such a plan fell out of favour so quickly, lends itself to a brief 
overview even by the scholars of the commission.  
 The United Nations’ failed internationalization of Jerusalem has been consigned to 
commentary as opposed to rigorous study. The best example of thoroughness is Bernard 
Wasserstein’s work on the city itself. In a chapter titled “Division,” Wasserstein outlines the 
contested histories surrounding Jerusalem and looks directly at the internationalization 
discussions occurring under the auspices of the PCC.93 Saadia Touval has a whole chapter on the 
PCC, but his attention is on the refugee mediation as opposed to the Jerusalem debates. His 
commentary on Jerusalem is limited to a select few pages.94 Touval’s descriptive contributions 
situate the UN commission in broader peacemaking endeavours and place blame for its failure, 
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pointing to the shortcomings of the Western powers, especially the United States, for the 
commission “end[ing] in total failure.”95 John Quigley sprinkles in discussions about the city 
among broader discussions of Israel’s early statehood.96 Other authors of the city and the early 
“peace process” make space for UN efforts to internationalize Jerusalem, yet only do so in 
passing.97   
This MA thesis is based on the archival collection of the United Nations in New York 
City. Numerous reports, correspondences, telegrams, and UN meetings provide rich insights into 
how the international body sought to bring about the internationalization of Jerusalem and the 
subsequent damage control undertaken after the plan failed to be implemented. This thesis uses 
previously uncited PCC-specific documents, such as correspondences between mediators, cables 
from conferences to the upper echelons of the United Nations’ government, Palestinian and 
Zionist conversations with the commission, and commission progress reports. These PCC 
archival materials are complemented by official UN resolutions, records of the Trusteeship 
Council, and minutes of the General Assembly. This thesis thus distinguishes itself from the 
existing work, which has relied on the latter primary sources and neglected the former. 
This MA thesis incorporates important primary documents complementing UN archival 
research. The Mideast Mirror, a Cairo-based information digest, provided Arab perspectives on 
the UN proceedings pertaining to its plan to internationalize Jerusalem during the period under 
study. Translated to English, it frequently provided commentary by Arab leaders, political 
 
95 Ibid., 76. Touval begins the final paragraph of the PCC chapter by stating: “The commission’s failure can be 
attributed in large measure to American policies.” Ibid., 104.   
96 Quigley, The International Diplomacy of Israel’s Founders, 77-79; 108; 140. 
97 Eugene Bovis, The Jerusalem Question, 1917-1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 70-91; and 
Cattan, Jerusalem, 37-38. See also: Randval, “The First Major Test,” 206-207; Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
144-145; and Irene L. Gendzier, Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine, & the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the 






officials, and Palestinians on the discussions around Jerusalem and debates surrounding the 
United Nations’ place within the early Arab-Israeli “peace process.” The Mideast Mirror cites 
newspapers such as Falastin reporting on Palestine, El Misri from Cairo, Egypt, and Al Nasr out 
of Damascus, Syria, as well as commentary from Arab deputies, ambassadors, and dignitaries 
involved in the internationalization discussions. The Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) further buttresses UN archival materials by providing important insights into the United 
States’ position as an established global actor, emerging ally to Israel, and acting mediation 
member of the PCC. While this MA thesis focuses on the United Nations, the United States’ role 
in the UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem was integral. Other primary sources consulted 
include The Palestine Post, documents from the United Kingdom and the League of Nations 
mandate for Palestine, and Papal encyclicals. By including these additional primary sources, I 
incorporate important voices outside the United Nations bureaucratic arena and show how the 
attempted internationalization of the Holy City was not limited to the new international 
organization. The incorporation of non-UN perspectives enriches, complicates, and enhances the 
historical relevance of Jerusalem in the late 1940s and early 1950s.   
The layout of the thesis is centered around the establishment, introduction, actions, and 
demise of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the UN body tasked with planning the 
internationalization of Jerusalem. Chapter one contextualizes the United Nations’ involvement in 
Jerusalem leading up to the formation of the PCC. This chapter, furthermore, discusses the 
problematic role of the United Nations’ attempts to govern territory through the lens of 
international sovereignty. Chapter two offers an in-depth look at the work of the commission 
itself through actions in both Jerusalem and New York. What roles did it occupy? How did it 





antithetical expectations of the international organization’s nation-state members? Chapter three 
analyzes the end of the commission’s work concerning Jerusalem and the immediate aftermath at 
the United Nations. While in official operation into the 1970s, the PCC terminated its mandate in 
the Holy City in April 1950 when the United Nations transferred Jerusalem to its Trusteeship 
Council. This chapter examines the demise of the commission, the reintroduction of the 
Trusteeship Council, and how this transfer affected the United Nations’ internationalization plan 
in Jerusalem.   
On paper, the so-called Jerusalem question had a simple solution in UN imaginations. 
Yet the story was drastically different on the ground, as the failure of UN internationalization 
indicates. The following pages seek to show how Jerusalem became a microcosm for the United 
Nations’ efforts in Palestine. Furthermore, they aim to nuance the role of Jerusalem in the United 
Nations’ imperial way of being to understand how the ambitions of the international organization 









The Beginnings of Internationalization: How the United Nations Got to Resolution 194 
 
As Britain retreated from its mandate in Palestine, the “question” of the future of the 
Holy Land morphed into a UN “problem.” There were many unknowns. What would Jerusalem 
look like? Who would govern the territory? How would peace be kept? Would Indigenous 
Palestinians, Zionist settlers, and neighboring non-Palestinian Arabs coexist? With the British 
departure imminent, the High Commissioner of Palestine gave UNSCOP parting words of 
wisdom lost on the twenty-three years of previous governance by His Majesty’s Government: 
“We do our best to be impartial and in this case would much prefer to deal with a constructive 
future than a destructive past.”98  
 Such was the temperature as the broader “Palestine question” narrowed onto a key aspect 
of UN mediation efforts in the late 1940s. While Jerusalem was not the sole recipient of attention 
for the United Nations, internationalization efforts in the city remain a vital chapter in the history 
of the early Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace processes. Various dioceses, governments, 
newspapers, and diplomats all faced the end of the British mandate in Palestine with a potential 
rise of a personal cause and hopes for a much more prosperous future than the sputtering history 
of recent memory. Jerusalem soon became a central issue. The United Nations made the city key 
in its imagined peace plan, both in the immediate and the gradual.  
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 This chapter situates the United Nations in historical debates on the future of Jerusalem 
and explains the backstory of internationalization efforts. UN Resolution 181 partitioned 
Palestine into three zones: “Arab,” “Jewish,” and “international.” The international zone set 
Jerusalem and its environs aside for governance from the United Nations itself. An “international 
regime” was to be established in the first two months after the mandate ended, but no later than 1 
October 1948.99 By the time October came around, however, Jerusalem was far from being the 
UN enclave the organization envisaged. By looking at the events leading up to the enactment of 
UN Resolution 194 in December 1948, which called for the return of Palestinian refugees, the 
creation of the PCC, and a resolution of the “Jerusalem question,” this chapter argues that the 
United Nations inherited and promulgated an imperial way of being forged in the interwar period 
by the collective actions of Western imperial powers.  
 
Early Internationalization Discussions and Sovereignty 
Jerusalem’s quasi-international status enacted through the Ottoman Status Quo hardened 
following World War I. As European powers, primarily Britain, France and Russia, gathered to 
carve up the remnants of defeated empires, Palestine came up for discussion with Ottoman 
capitulation in 1918. Importantly, and problematically, these discussions occurred before the 
empire collapsed and before sovereignty expired. Three events defined the five years after the 
Great War: the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the Husain-McMahon Correspondence of 1915-
16, and the establishment of the League of Nations-led British mandate in 1920.  
 Sykes-Picot was a clandestine agreement forged between Britain and France in mid-May 
1916 to distribute the remnants of the Central powers’ land after World War I. Specific emphasis 
 






was placed on the Ottoman territories, which remained under Ottoman control until 1918. The 
agreement spoke of a “brown area,” coincidentally over Jerusalem, which was to “be established 
[as] an international administration.”100 Seeing as neither of the two imperial powers wanted to 
see the city in the hands of the other, internationalizing the region became a method of 
compromise.101 Consultation with Russia and “other Allies” were pending prior to any 
conclusions being drawn.102 Yet it was clear Britain and France saw the Holy Land as a place 
which defied sovereignty and incumbent conventions of international relations.  
 Sykes-Picot occurred despite an agreement for post-war land governance already in 
place. In 1915 Britain struck a separate deal regarding control of Palestinian land with the 
Hashemite Kingdom in the Hejaz. Known as the Husain-McMahon Correspondence (Husain bin 
Ali al-Hashimi was the Sharif of Mecca and Henry McMahon was the British High 
Commissioner in Egypt), the document requested a Hashemite attack on the Ottoman empire in 
Arabia to open another front in the Allied war effort. In return, Britain promised the recognition 
of Arab states (specifically in the Hashemite-controlled region of the Hejaz, today a part of Saudi 
Arabia), and to “guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize 
their inviolability.”103 Once again, Britain advanced that Jerusalem be considered a “special” 
territory in the region.104 While not a direct call for Jerusalem’s internationalization, these brief 
allusions indicated that Britain had eyes on the city and viewed it to be outside the purview of 
any Arab leader’s full sovereignty, let alone the sovereignty of Indigenous Palestinians. 
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Ideas of internationalization were nearly the exclusive purview of Western powers and 
served as a test of European colonial enterprises on a new platform.105 This international form of 
governance was intentionally muddled to keep imperial rule hidden behind a notion of eventual 
local self-determination.106 Britain, France and Italy, along with the United States and Japan, met 
in April 1920 at San Remo, Italy to discuss the borders of various proposed mandates. European 
victors gathered with individualistic goals of imperial clout in mind rather than adherence to 
local sovereignties in Palestine. Britain came to the conference believing the terms of Sykes-
Picot were irrelevant given the circumstances of Britain’s expulsion of the Ottoman empire and 
desire for more territory in the Mashriq.107 Phrased another way, Britain thought it had done 
more to rid the region of the Ottomans than the other Western powers. As such, it deserved more 
land as compensation. France, not wanting the territory of Syria slated for French control to 
evaporate, insisted on Sykes-Picot being upheld whether the region of Palestine was international 
or British in governance.108   
The mandate in Palestine, and Britain’s responsibilities associated with it, were tabled 
during the week-long conference in northwest Italy. The Italian Prime Minister, Signor 
Francesco Saverio Nitti, was adamant about the place of Catholicism in the mandate as it 
pertained to the protection and rights of non-Jewish communities.109 Nitti later stressed the 
importance of “the international point of view” and the necessity of having a “civilized” nation at 
the helm when deciding upon the country charged with protecting Christian interests in 
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Palestine.110 The following day, the powers agreed that the British mandate did not infringe upon 
the already-existing rights exercised by non-Jewish peoples in Palestine, especially Western 
ones, though Muslim interests were not directly mentioned.111  
These plans had detractors though, most notably Lord George Curzon of Britain. Present 
at San Remo, Curzon was very cautious about a Jewish state in Palestine, which he thought could 
lead to large uprisings from the Indigenous Palestinian population.112 He also believed Britain 
owed the Hashemite family on moral and political grounds following the successful revolt 
against Ottoman rule as outlined in the Husain-McMahon Correspondence.113 He cautioned 
against tying too much of Palestine up in mandates before consulting Emir Feisal of the 
Hashemites and before considering the potential for animosities to grow with reneged 
agreements.114 While Jerusalem was not explicitly mentioned, there were allusions to distributing 
the less desirable Ottoman territories first before diving into the full extent of former Ottoman 
lands. France wanted to ensure the Hashemites had as little control as possible to safeguard the 
new territorial holdings in Syria.115 With Britain set to control Palestine, the question of 
internationalizing the Holy Sites resurfaced as a way for non-British imperial powers to exert 
nominal control over the region more so than ensuring the rights of local populations.116  
From San Remo sprang the British mandate for Palestine. Devised under the leadership 
of South African General Jan Smuts, mandates were meant to be a form of government for 
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peoples deemed incapable of self-government, as determined by imperial powers in the League 
of Nations.117 Jerusalem was included in this so-called guardianship due to the Holy Sites and its 
perceived strategic nature.118 Codified by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, the British 
mandatory power set up in Palestine with Jerusalem under its domain. Articles 13-16 of the 
declaration dealt with the protection of Holy Places. Article 13 ensured free access to the Holy 
Sites. Article 14 outlined the creation of a commission to determine claims to Holy Sites. Article 
15 spoke to the freedom of religious expression for all faiths. And Article 16 reminded the 
Mandatory that it was responsible for the supervision of “religious or eleemosynary bodies of all 
faiths” throughout Palestine.119 The British mandate, in short, ensured Jerusalem was not the 
sovereign property of Palestinians, Arabs, or Zionists. Instead, Jerusalem was to be administered 
indirectly by an international body, the League of Nations, and directed by its British delegate. 
  The brief mentions of internationalization in Sykes-Picot and Husain-McMahon emerged 
from the murkiness in the British mandate for Palestine. Allusions to British control of the Holy 
Places were explicitly written in Article 13, which stated that “All responsibility in connection 
with the Holy Places…is assumed by the Mandatory.”120 The mandate specifically referenced the 
Balfour declaration as a guiding principle and the desire to see a Jewish national home ran strong 
through the introductory remarks.121 This was undertaken, optimistically, with the problematic 
assumption that no real territorial disputes with Palestinians or Arabs would arise.122 With the 
mandate securing the Holy Places, all was deemed to be relatively secure in Palestine in Western 
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imaginations. Even after these three events occurred, and with the British mandate fully 
operational, more internationally-themed discussions continued to grip the future standing of 
Jerusalem and its environs.  
The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, popularly remembered for establishing the borders of 
the Turkish Republic, further commented on the Holy City and its future. For Jerusalem, this 
treaty ensured that any pilgrims crossing through the new Republic of Turkey en route to the 
Holy Sites were allowed access and safe travel, along with sanitary conditions in the country.123 
For Indigenous Palestinian Arabs more broadly, the treaty took away the last vestiges of an 
Ottoman identity and citizenship while finalizing the authority of the League of Nations and its 
mandatory power.124 Sovereignty over Jerusalem was passed to Britain specifically, and the 
League of Nations more generally, due to the absence of the Ottoman empire as opposed to any 
real legitimate transfer of sovereign power.125 For Britain, Palestine was not a nation.126 As such, 
Palestinians—Muslim, Christian and Jewish—were ineligible for citizenship or sovereign control 
over a territorial space.127 Instead, citizenship and governance rested with the international 
League of Nations.  
The Peel Commission, issued in 1937 and one of the final key acts of the British mandate 
in Palestine, further outlined Jerusalem’s imagined international future. Created to ascertain the 
prospects of Palestinian Arab and Zionist Jewish cooperation, the Royal Commission touched 
upon the importance of Jerusalem moving forward for the region.128 The Peel Commission 
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referenced French preferences from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1915, arguing “Jerusalem and 
part of Palestine should be reserved for international administration” owing to its “world-wide 
importance.”129 Drawing on notions of Palestinian and Jerusalem exceptionalism, the Peel 
Commission thought Palestine was different from the other former Ottoman territories under the 
purview of the mandate system.130 Seeing as Peel was constructed to inquire about a path 
towards peaceful co-existence in Palestine between Palestinians and Zionists, the 
internationalization of Jerusalem served as a tool to remove a particularly sticky point of 
contention between the two supposedly irreconcilable foes.131 The British report concluded by 
suggesting “a new Mandate,” specifically for the protection of the Holy Places “for all 
nations.”132 The Peel Commission thus served as the principle document delocalizing Jerusalem 
while partitioning it from Palestinian lands in Western imaginations in the process.133  
Whereas the White Paper of 1939, a British retort to its own Peel Commission on the eve 
of World War II, dealt primarily with Zionist Jewish immigration and Indigenous Palestinian 
discontent, it also commented on the Holy Places. The White Paper reiterated the international 
flavour of governance vis-à-vis the Holy Places, claiming there was “no dispute” about this issue 
for Western powers, especially Britain.134 The White Paper clearly communicated that Jerusalem 
could not be under the sovereign control of Palestinians, Arabs or Zionists, which angered all 
local parties.135 With the Holy Places serving as ample justification, Jerusalem was set aside 
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from the rest of Palestine. While the British mandatory document was not clear on how the city 
should be governed, it clearly outlined how Jerusalem should not be governed.  
 
The United Nations and the Future of Jerusalem 
The documents, commissions, and conferences of the 1920s and 1930s all guided 
Jerusalem towards an international status. By the time the United Nations inherited the 
“Jerusalem question” in the late 1940s, there was an already well-established lineage of 
internationalization desires passed down from one aspirant imperial power to another. Upon 
requesting the help of the United Nations on 14 February 1947, Britain placed Palestine into the 
hands of a new international organization armed with the skillset and desire to take the 
internationalization cause beyond its disconnected, exploratory stage.136 The United Nations 
created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to enquire into solutions 
Britain could not find. Jerusalem remained a key component of the ongoing discussions.  
One of the main sources of support for an internationalized Jerusalem in early 1947 came 
from Christian leaders, both within and beyond Palestine. Writing to UNSCOP with opinions 
and pleas, these religious leaders saw an opportunity to pander to post-war religious reckonings 
and make Jerusalem a bastion for an international representation of the Abrahamic faiths. The 
Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem noted that Jerusalem ought to become wonderful once more, and this 
necessitated an international flavour to governance.137 The Bishop of the Anglican Church in 
Jerusalem, for his part, opposed internationalization in 1947, but commented that a city governed 
by a mixture of Arabs and Jews would squash out the Christian minority in the city, as well as 
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possible access to the Holy Sites.138 Bishop Stewart adapted the Zionist myth “David vs. 
Goliath,” contending that Palestinian Muslims had ample support from the surrounding Arab 
countries.139 The “very small number of Christians” in Jerusalem, however, might not have 
religious rights adhered to.140 Coptic Egyptians wrote to the United Nations as well, asking for a 
continuation of the Ottoman-era Status Quo and the assurance of access to Jerusalem’s Holy 
Places.141 Other denominations and respective Bishops wrote to ensure that lakes outside 
Jerusalem were not going to be subject to Zionist developments, the United Nations recognized 
the sanctity of the city, and that the standards of Muslim Sultans in the recognition of Christian 
and Jewish causes be met.142  
For Palestinian, Arab, and Zionist leaders, the United Nations’ efforts to internationalize 
Jerusalem came with a myriad of reservations. King Abdullah of Jordan—who as a Hashemite 
saw his family rule over the Holiest Sites of Islam in the 1920s—believed the Holy Places were 
subject to Jordanian and Islamic guardianship.143 David Ben-Gurion, the future first Prime 
Minister of Israel, noted in a July 1947 meeting with UN representatives that the focus on 
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Jerusalem was overblown and that “the Holy Places are only a few places in Jerusalem.”144 For 
Zionists, Jerusalem could be subject to partition, but losing it entirely ran counter to the mythos 
created in the Zionist settler colonial enterprise.145 For Arabs, generally, the centuries of religious 
protection under the Ottomans, as well as Hashemite family lineage of protection in Mecca and 
Medina, were enough to dampen the intentions of the United Nations.  
A voice lacking in these letters to the United Nations are those of Palestinian and Muslim 
communities. The United Nations archives lack much reference to Islamic denominations, 
Palestinian Christians, or Indigenous and Sephardic Jews writing the United Nations asking for 
religious rights or for an internationalized Jerusalem. This could be chalked up to the Palestinian 
Arab boycott of UNSCOP, but larger issues were at play. On the whole, Zionists and Palestinian 
Sephardic Jews did not share similar ideologies on the future of Jerusalem or Palestine despite 
adhering to the same religion.146 Jamal Bey Husseini, executive member of Palestine’s Arab 
Higher Committee, noted in April 1948 how Jerusalem was a crucial city for Muslims and 
questioned why the United Nations was so transfixed by Jerusalem while ignoring many of the 
other Holy Sites in Palestine, such as Tiberias and Nazareth.147 For Indigenous Palestinians like 
Husseini, the UN focus on Jerusalem held international importance, but it meant Zionists would 
be able to take Palestinian land and that “Arabs are the ones who are losing their country.”148 
Iraqi representative Sayid Awny Khalidy echoed this statement in the same meeting, stating that 
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Arabs were already giving up the most out of any group in the negotiations.149 Palestinian 
Christians, writ large, supported Palestinian Muslims in an anti-Zionist approach to proceedings 
citing fears of Zionist control over the Holy Places.150 Abdullah Effendi Kardus, the District 
Officer of the sub-district of Bethlehem, noted how the Status Quo already established by 
Ottoman decree, and carried forward by the British mandate, ensured that religious structures 
outside of Jerusalem were safe without internationalization.151 Maronite Christians of 
neighboring Lebanon, including the patriarch Antione Pierre Arida, told UNSCOP that the 
Church supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.152  
Ultimately, UNSCOP’s report on 3 September 1947 to the General Assembly promoted 
partition and a three-state solution in Palestine: an Arab zone, a Jewish zone, and an international 
zone focused on Jerusalem and governed by the United Nations. Jerusalem would be home to a 
so-called international government in this iteration of the plan. And while members of UNSCOP 
debated the extent of internationalization, none outwardly refuted its necessity.153 Not once did 
the UN commission consider granting independence for Palestinians, in Jerusalem or Palestine 
more broadly, despite the express intent of the mandate system to prepare nations for 
independence.154 UN Resolution 181 of 27 November 1947 formally took the whispers of 
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Sovereignty Concerns After Resolution 181 
 Legally defined, sovereignty is the authority to govern a territory, a country, or a city, 
combining a myriad of separate entities into one cohesive political unit.155 The United Nations 
itself defined sovereignty in 1947 as “supreme authority, an authority which is independent of 
any other earthly authority.”156 Neither Palestinian, Zionist, or Arab leaders welcomed UN 
Resolution 181’s internationalization of Jerusalem wholeheartedly. Each party voiced various 
levels of displeasure with the prospects of the Holy City being removed from an autonomous 
Palestinian, Jewish, or Arab state, depending on how much sovereignty was being stripped in the 
negotiations. The sovereignty of the city and the decisions surrounding that sovereignty were not 
in the hands of its inhabitants. Instead sovereignty resided in the briefcases of diplomats 
predominantly representing members of Western nation-states.   
 Zionist documents sent to the United Nations after Resolution 181 provide key insights 
into how aspirant Zionist leaders in Palestine viewed international encroachments. Abba Eban, a 
liaison officer to UNSCOP and later Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, wrote a scathing 
exposé on how the United Nations’ actions regarding Jerusalem were illegal. In discussing 
sovereignty, Eban noted that “neither sovereignty nor any form of legal authority can be acquired 
by a mere expression of intention,” which he claimed the General Assembly did with Jerusalem 
before the latter became the mandatory responsibility of the United Nations in May 1948.157 Put 
another way, the United Nations could not just say Jerusalem was under UN jurisdiction. Writing 
in 1949, Eban again questioned the legitimacy of United Nations sovereignty in the region when 
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declaring no outside international force should speed up negotiations to fit an agenda outside its 
domain.158 What Zionists saw were UN attempts to circumvent legal parameters of control by 
operating under the auspices of a global collection of countries.  
Arab leaders and media were equally disgruntled at the early attempts of sovereignty 
infringement. Dr. Adnan el Atassi, the Syrian representative at the Lausanne Conference, wanted 
to see the United Nations in merely a supervisory role with sovereignty over Jerusalem falling to 
both Jordan and Israel.159 The Arabic press similarly considered Arab sacrifices of sovereignty in 
the popularly termed “Jerusalem Scheme” to be much higher than what Israel rescinded.160 “The 
Western World had disregarded Arab rights,” the newspaper El-Difaa concluded, and as such 
any moves towards internationalization acted against Palestinian and Arab sovereignties.161 As 
the United Nations settled into the region, Arab interests perceived it as a rival party, not an 
equal partner.162 Overall, Arabs who enjoyed relative freedoms under Ottoman rule became 
reacquainted with a new but familiar international design on Jerusalem. Much like the Zionists, 
Arabs saw no legal justification for the UN presence in Jerusalem.  
Ultimately, the question of sovereignty brought the United Nations’ position in Jerusalem 
into legal question. While the Westphalian concepts of state sovereignty allowed for such an 
enterprise to be discussed, empowered by the United Nations, understandings of sovereignty 
shifted away from the state and instead into a more popular form of self-determination in the 
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wake of a burgeoning human rights movement.163 Sovereignty, in the beginnings of a UN-
orchestrated postcolonial era, was to rest in the hands of people. What the United Nations did 
was attempt to wrest such a privilege from both Indigenous Palestinians and Zionist settlers.164  
 
The United Nations’ Imagined “Jerusalem Problem”  
The United Nations received a precise timeline for the handover of the British mandate in 
Palestine. Britain relinquished control to the United Nations at midnight on 15 May 1948. The 
United Nations requested this handover be completed as quickly as possible so it could start 
wrestling with the issues in earnest, without directly infringing in British affairs.165 Belying these 
words was the immense pressure put on the United Nations General Assembly, both internally 
and externally, to figure out what Jerusalem would look like and, more importantly, how the 
international organization would exercise sovereignty over the city.  
A meeting of the General Assembly on 14 May 1948 recorded panic surrounding 
Jerusalem and the United Nations’ position in relation to gaining sovereignty. Simply put, the 
United Nations needed to have writing in international law before the expiration of the British 
mandate to make any legitimate claim to control over the Holy City.166 The Guatemalan 
representative, Jorge García Granados, reported this to the General Assembly, which was further 
promoted by U.S. representative Warren Austin and put to a vote.167 The ensuing proposed 
resolution received twenty votes for, fifteen against, and nineteen abstentions: not enough for the 
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two-thirds majority needed to codify the resolution.168 In the eyes of Eban, and in turn 
international law, the lack of resolution from the United Nations prior to the termination of the 
British mandate in Palestine meant that there was no legal basis for the international organization 
to govern Jerusalem.169 Yet the efforts of the United Nations persisted. 
 Compounding the difficulties for the United Nations was the creation of the state of Israel 
on 15 May 1948—the same day the United Nations took charge of the mandate in Palestine. 
Famously, the United States recognized Israel a mere eleven minutes after its creation.170 When 
news reached the U.S. delegation at the United Nations, there was “pandemonium” and a strong 
sense of disbelief as well as threats from other nations, such as Cuba, to withdraw from the 
United Nations entirely, though that never came to pass.171 Non-Palestinian Arab personnel were 
“deeply disappointed,” “shocked,” and responded that the U.S. recognition of Israel “had crushed 
the hopes of the Arabs.”172 Britain realized that global endorsements of the Israeli state 
jeopardized peace in Palestine. As such, it sought to delay the outpouring of support for the new 
country as best as possible.173 The action of recognizing Israel by the United States, while 
innocent on the surface, impacted political and reconciliatory actions ongoing in Palestine. This 
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move not only signalled to the United Nations that a major ally operated with a separate agenda, 
but also told Indigenous Palestinians that the promises of previous administrations and the 
opportunities for self-determination were being discarded.174 On the grand scale, the admission 
of a recognized Israel onto the Palestinian landscape signalled a new negotiator at the diplomatic 
table. Israel quickly moved during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49 to incorporate areas of 
Jerusalem set aside for international administration into its own territory, hindering United 
Nations intentions.  
Two immediate issues gripped the United Nations’ internationalization efforts as it took 
on the mandatory role in Palestine/Israel: where to hold meetings and how to govern the city. 
The United Nations seemed much more concerned about where the meetings about Jerusalem 
took place than the substance of those meetings. The Government House, which served as both 
the headquarters of the British mandate and the residence of the British High Commissioner, was 
set aside to house UN operations in Jerusalem.175 Despite being in the neutral portion of the city, 
the building’s UN occupants showcased imperial continuity to local inhabitants. Logically, 
holding main discussions between the United Nations and relevant Zionist, Palestinian, and Arab 
factions meeting in Jerusalem made sense. Yet some UN members were against this idea. 
Concerned about prestige and safety of UN representatives, the location of Geneva, Switzerland 
received suggestions along with meetings at UN headquarters at Lake Success by the United 
States and in Istanbul or Ankara by Turkish personnel.176 Notwithstanding the controversial 
assassination of UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in September 1948, the United Nations 
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ultimately setup the headquarters of an international administration for Jerusalem inside the Holy 
City at the Government House.177  
Detractors and confusion remained. Leo Malania, a UN special executive assistant, tried 
to organize a the initial mediation meeting in Geneva.178 By March 1949, only sixteen months 
into the United Nation’s official efforts at internationalization, it appeared to UN officials as 
“though the days of actual headquarters in Jerusalem are numbered.”179 After the first Arab-
Israeli war of 1947-49, the Government House was not accessible to Palestinians or Arabs due to 
Zionist settler colonialism in the city.180 Andrew Cordier, the UN Undersecretary, angrily wrote 
Azcarate a week later, “that there has not been uniformity” in matters of headquarters or even 
what the United Nations called itself in the region.181 The United Nations remained centered in 
Jerusalem, but many of the important internationalization discussions took place outside the city 
in question.   
The principle governing aspect of the UN’s internationalization efforts in May 1948 
rested in the position of Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem. A de facto mayor, this person 
represented a point of continuity between the League of Nations and the United Nations in 
administering the daily affairs of the Holy City. Importantly, the United Nations, Zionists, Arabs 
(though not specifically Palestinians) and the departing British High Commissioner needed to 
approve the appointment of a municipal commissioner.182 Cementing an imperial way of being, 
this four-way confirmation and the lack of Palestinian-specific consultation into the future 
government of Jerusalem shook confidences in the United Nations even further. The municipal 
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commissioner represented “the thin edge of the wedge,” according to Jordanian officials, taking 
the idea of an internationalized Jerusalem and making it a reality.183  
The United Nations settled on a person from the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC) for the post. Initially, the United Nations wanted AFSC Executive Secretary Clarence 
Pickett to be municipal commissioner, but his ailing health forced him to decline.184 The next in 
line, at the behest of Pickett, was Harold Evans, a Quaker lawyer from Philadelphia.185 Evans 
never took up the post, however. He made it to Cairo hoping for a cessation of hostilities in 
Jerusalem, but did not ever assume the mayorship on account of his Quaker morals not agreeing 
with armoured transfers for safety in the city.186 This UN position was filled by Pablo de 
Azcarate, a Spanish diplomat already in Jerusalem on an ad interim basis. Once Evans tenured 
his resignation in June 1948, the temporary post became permanent. Azcarate occupied the role 
for eighteen months.187  
The international presence in Jerusalem was not welcomed by its residents. Pamphlets 
denounced the United Nations’ push towards internationalization.188 These leaflets, issued by the 
Zionist Stern Gang, called all UN personnel “spies” and demanded the departure of anyone 
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attempting to tinker with Israeli sovereignty.189 King Abdullah of Jordan, who claimed to 
represent Palestinians and was the de facto voice of the Arab world in UN imaginations, opposed 
an internationalized Jerusalem.190 The United Nations, then, did not have enough local support to 
complete the internationalizing mission of Resolution 181. 
 
United Nation’s Path to Resolution 194 and Further Internationalization 
 By early April 1948, before Israel’s establishment, UN members already questioned how 
much sway Resolution 181 had on the so-called Jerusalem question. Pablo de Azcarate wrote to 
Ralph Bunche that anyone “familiar with the situation” seemed to agree the resolution was not 
enough to get United Nations’ control of the Holy City.191 Azcarate also mentioned Jerusalem 
was “obviously a much easier problem” than resolving tensions between Palestinians, Israelis, 
Arabs, and Western Zionists in toto. In his opinion, peace in Jerusalem ought to be the key 
priority in securing a truce or a semblance of a wide-sweeping truce.192 Whispers circulated of 
temporary Arab cooperation with UN internationalization.193 With enough persuasion, UN 
circles hoped Israelis would follow suit.194 These optimistic outlooks proved elusive, however, as 
King Abdullah of Jordan viewed Jerusalem with an expansionist eye rather than a city falling 
under the administration of the United Nations.195  
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The most authoritative voice calling for Jerusalem’s internationalization after Resolution 
181’s adoption was Pope Pius XII. Pius XII released a Papal Encyclical on 24 October 1948—
well after Resolution 181 and the United Nations takeover—speaking to the fractured nature of 
Jerusalem. Although there was no direct mention of the United Nations, his message was clear: 
Jerusalem was a city with a distinct “international character.”196 The pope called for 
“international guarantees” of free access to the Holy Places in Jerusalem and Palestine more 
broadly.197 The Holy See was a vocal contributor to discussions at the General Assembly, 
imploring Catholic countries to see the benefits of a Christian-based international regime in 
Jerusalem.198 The Catholic Church favoured internationalization over a fractured city where war 
not only impacted the safety of the Holy Sites, but also pilgrims travelling to Jerusalem.199 Pius 
XII released another encyclical in April 1949, carefully choosing his words by stating that a 
“united effort of nations” was required to bring stability to Jerusalem.200 The internationalization 
cause did not begin at the Vatican, or by Christianity writ large. Yet Christian denominations 
recognized the impending struggle in Palestine between Palestinian Muslims and Zionist Jews 
and sought out the United Nations to be the neutral-but-Christian voice in the conflict.201  
 A key continuation from the British mandate to the United Nations was a proposed 
special commission through the League of Nations “to study, define and determine the rights and 
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claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different 
religious communities in Palestine.”202 This quote was lifted by the United Nations directly from 
Article 14 of the League of Nations’ mandate for Palestine document from 1922 and served as 
the anchoring idea for how the United Nations approached mediation in Jerusalem moving 
forward.203 No such commission ever materialized through the League of Nations, but the spirit 
was adopted by the United Nations. Resolution 194, ratified on 11 December 1948, established 
the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) with visions of continuing pursuits in Jerusalem as 
outlined in Resolution 181.204 This commission became the touchstone of internationalization 
efforts from its conception onwards, and was the most serious effort the international 
organization put into the matter.205 The United Nations worked for seven months on the 
internationalization aspect of this commission and produced a draft statute for the city, which 
was never adhered to with any faithfulness.206 Despite its lack of success, the PCC and 
Resolution 194 more generally stood as further markers of the imperial peacemaking the United 
Nations engaged in through the efforts of internationalization, and sowed further descent 
between Palestinians, Arabs, Zionists and Israelis.  
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“An Inquest on Failure”:  




As the United Nations’ efforts towards an internationalized Jerusalem funneled into the 
Palestine Conciliation Commission, a new era of futile diplomacy emerged. This less-than one-
year period saw several conferences bringing Arabs, Israelis, Muslims, and Zionists together for 
mediation, but resulted in few conclusions beyond mounting frustrations. Conferences in Beirut 
and Lausanne, along with meetings with Indigenous Palestinians, Arabs and Israelis separately, 
all attempted to tread a delicate line between impartial and imperial peace-making. This chapter 
looks at the Palestine Conciliation Commission, its conferences and meetings, as well as its 
structure, to showcase how the United Nations continued its efforts towards an international 
Jerusalem.  
 This chapter argues that the United Nations did not want to make peace with Palestinian, 
Arab, or Israeli representatives about Jerusalem; instead, what the organization wanted was to 
have those delegations come to peace with the implementation of an international regime in 
Jerusalem. The reconciliatory actions of the United Nations concerning Jerusalem were not so 
much between Palestinians, Israelis, and Arabs, but instead between the coalition of the 
delegations and the mandate given by the General Assembly. This severely hindered UN abilities 
to properly undertake tasked mediation. What follows is the story of how the United Nations 
sought to gain sovereignty over Palestinian land while simultaneously alluding to peace between 
warring factions in the Mashriq. The decision to make Jerusalem an international enclave, in 
 





short, was the desire of the United Nations and no one else; at least not at this initial juncture 
between December 1948 and September 1949.   
 General Assembly Resolution 194 was the second installment of UN designs on 
Jerusalem in just over a year. The brief allusions in Resolution 181 were more concretely laid out 
in Resolution 194. What the November 1947 resolution called a “Special International Regime” 
was given greater attentive intention in the December 1948 iteration, stating that “the present 
municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding towns and villages…should be accorded special 
treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations 
control.”208 The new resolution renounced key ideas imbedded in Resolution 181, notably that 
Jerusalem should be under the sovereign control of the United Nations and eventually governed 
by the Trusteeship Council, which was essentially the international organization’s successor for 
the mandate system.209 Resolution 194 gave a clearer path to internationalization from a UN 
perspective and also solidified the fears of Palestinian, Arab, and Israeli peoples that the 
organization was set to deny local sovereignty in the Holy City.  
 The December 1948 resolution aimed to make Jerusalem a United Nations city through 
the work of a three-country commission. The PCC, also stylized as the Conciliation Commission 
for Palestine or CCP, applied Resolution 194 to produce “detailed proposals for a permanent 
international regime for the territory of Jerusalem” no later than the fourth regular session of the 
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General Assembly in October 1949.210 The commission consisted of three UN member 
countries: Turkey, France, and the United States.  
 The commission members were decided upon at the 186th Plenary Meeting of the UN 
General Assembly in Paris on 11 December 1948—the same day Resolution 194 came into 
force. The Turkish representative was Hussein C. Yalcin, France sent Claude de Boisanger, and 
the United States charged Mark Ethridge. Joseph Keenan was meant to be the United States’ 
choice, but he stepped down for “personal reasons.”211 Pablo de Azcarate, who still held the 
position of ad interim Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem, was tapped as the 
secretariat of the party.212 These four men formed the image of conciliation at the conferences 
and of the United Nations mediation efforts more broadly in Palestine.  
The Jerusalem Committee was an important organ created to help the PCC solve the 
“Jerusalem question,” especially considering the United Nations’ lack of presence in the Holy 
City itself. Founded in March 1949, the Jerusalem Committee consisted of members from 
Turkey, France, and the United States and reported directly to the PCC.213 With the larger 
commission tied up in all facets of Resolution 194, the Jerusalem Committee focused solely 
upon the internationalization of Jerusalem without worrying about other squabbles between 
parties. Its express mission determined the feasibility and practicality of internationalization, 
alongside gathering more general details to pass along to the main commission.214 
Early meetings and discussions concerning the Jerusalem Committee held a tenuous air 
of optimism. Ethridge deemed the subcommittee had work ahead of it, while Boisanger thought 
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it should operate with an eye to more practical endeavours, however difficult or impossible a task 
that proved to be.215 Muhammad Ali Hamade, a representative from Lebanon, noted the 
Jerusalem Committee’s “exceptionally great responsibility,” and that its proposals would 
determine “whether the future brought peace or war.”216 While the main commission worked on 
the full scope of the Palestine “problem,” the Jerusalem committee could “peck away” at the 
finer details of placing the Holy City under formal UN sovereignty.217 According to Willie Snow 
Ethridge, the wife of US PCC representative Mark who was present in Jerusalem, “the Jerusalem 
committee grow[s] haggard by night trying to reach a happy solution, and they exhaust 
themselves by day interviewing the innumerable heads of the three religions.”218 This subsect of 
the main commission featured prominently in the actual movements towards internationalization 
and did hold a number of meetings expressly concerned with Resolution 194’s request. Yet 
Jerusalem was also the purview of the larger commission and featured prominently in its separate 
discussions.   
 One key area of consternation was getting the commissioners as well as Palestinians, 
Arabs, and Israelis together for discussions. In the week preceding the commencement of 
negotiations, and before any conciliation efforts began, top officials in the United Nations were 
already questioning the prospects of a successful mediation through the commission on any 
level. George Barnes, a former UN spokesman and the Deputy Principle Secretary of the PCC, 
wrote in late January 1949 about his apprehensions surrounding the commissioners and the 
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ability to attain anything noteworthy.219 The safety of the commissioners concerned the United 
Nations given the general disdain of having UN personnel in the city with designs towards an 
international enclave.220 Notwithstanding, the commission decided to have the bulk of the staff, 
and at least some of the meetings, held in Jerusalem.221 And yet, despite Jerusalem being an 
obvious choice and giving the impression of the United Nations meeting Palestinians, Arabs and 
Israelis closer to home, the main conferences of the PCC were held outside of the city.  
Still, the PCC decided that the commission was to be headquartered in the Holy City. The 
First Progress Report of the PCC, released on 1 March 1949, stated the Government House in a 
demilitarized and neutral area of Jerusalem was to be the commission’s headquarters.222 As the 
PCC declared itself the latest occupant of the former residence of the British High Commissioner 
for Palestine, it established imperial linkage in Jerusalem with its British mandatory 
predecessor.223 While ultimately taking important conferences outside the city, this first step—
and initial optimism—pointed towards the city still holding a primordial place in PCC 
negotiations despite the deafening calls for Palestinian refugee repatriation. Jerusalem was still 
not under UN authority—the United Nations merely resolved that internationalization and the 
transfer of sovereignty should occur, as noted in March 1949 by Andrew Cordier, the de facto 
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second in command of the United Nations.224 It was the role of the PCC to transform this 
intention into a blueprint. 
 Before all sides met at the diplomatic table, there were internal UN discussions about the 
legitimacy of the commission and the practical nature of the commissioners. None of the 
commissioners themselves were well versed in Mashriq history, politics, or peacemaking, and 
relied heavily on the supporting staff in matters of nuance.225 For George Barnes, in a letter to 
Cordier, the hopes of the PCC’s success rested solely on Mark Ethridge. “Ethridge…is of a 
rather different calibre,” the deputy-secretary remarked, “and I am pinning lots of hope on 
him.”226 The United States wielded the most political power of the three countries, and Ethridge 
inherited that responsibility with his desire for swift gains in mediation and a short temper when 
the task proved to be more process than progress.227 Both Yalcin and Boisanger, at least for 
Barnes, seemed eager to disregard the previous efforts of the United Nations and start anew.228 
Boisanger was seen as a classic diplomat. His PCC appointment gave it legitimacy, but he 
seemed unconcerned with leading and happily allowed Ethridge and the United States to take the 
reins.229 Yalcin was an older journalist who also did not stand in the way of the United States 
leading the commission.230 Barnes put in his postscript that Yalcin’s two “advisors” were 
“particularly irritating” and hinted at a general contempt for the Turkish delegation.231 There 
were even questions about paying the three commissioners the same amount, though equal 
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compensation was ultimately “consider[ed] advisable.”232 Furthermore, Barnes questioned the 
role of Azcarate and the Spaniard’s apprehension of bringing component advisors onto the 
commission for support.233 Before the commission met for any mediation efforts, it was clear the 
United States was the principal player, while France and Turkey took on more quiet supportive 
roles.  
 Prior to any conferences, PCC personnel travelled to various capitals around the Mashriq 
to ascertain what was important to local governments. The commission went, in order, to Cairo, 
Riyadh, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv, with formal conversations, elegant banquets, 
and an eye to the future work of the commission.234 This tour of the Mashriq began just two days 
after Ethridge arrived in Jerusalem, as the other two commissioners felt the need to wait in 
Jerusalem and have “social meetings” with Jordanian and Israeli officials in the interim, which 
excluded Palestinian leadership.235 A month after his arrival, Ethridge called the 
internationalization of Jerusalem “a noble ideal” while meetings of Israelis and Jordanians took 
place behind UN backs in regards to a Jerusalem settlement.236 Grumblings by Ethridge about 
the need to show passes when crossing from one portion of Jerusalem to another underpinned the 
fractured state of the body meant to bring stability to the city and furthered notions that 
internationalization was a dream long before it was a feasible reality.237  
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The Beirut Conference 
 The Palestine Conciliation Commission set out to make quick work of the “Palestine 
problem” with its first major conference in Beirut, Lebanon. It was seen as “a purely temporary 
organ” by the commission’s press secretary due to the perceived ease at which the UN plan 
would be implemented.238 Lasting from 21 March to 5 April, the meetings were meant to start 
the proceedings and have tangible conversations with multiple parties instead of shuttling 
between various cities. The story of the commission, essentially, was a broad Arab insistence on 
a resolution of the refugee issue and Israeli refusals to make any concessions on the matter of 
refugees, which stymied all other mediation efforts.239 Ahmad Shuqayri, a Palestinian 
representing the Government of Syria and the future first chairman of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, remarked to the commission that “the keys to the country were in Israel’s 
hands.”240 It was “absolutely out of the question” that a resolution to the Palestinian “problem” 
could be found without considerable attention to refugees.241 Israel refused to repatriate refugees 
outside of discussions surrounding a broader peace agreement, while the Arabs generally 
rebuffed broader peace agreements without a refugee resolution.242 Importantly, Ethridge 
presented a summary of the Israeli position at the conference seeing as the Zionist delegation did 
not attend the meetings in Beirut.243 A stalemate arose. When viewed more closely, however, the 
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events at Beirut foreshadowed not only the demise of the PCC, but also the less-than-optimal 
circumstances surrounding the UN internationalization of Jerusalem.  
The decision of the Arab delegations to focus on the repatriation of refugees as opposed 
to the question of Jerusalem can be attributed to the humanitarian crisis following the Nakba. 
The Nakba, Arabic for catastrophe, signals both the historical calamity of the creation of the 
Israeli Zionist state, as well as the continuation of Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine.244 At 
Israel’s inception, roughly 750,000 Indigenous Palestinians were displaced through intentional 
settler colonialism into neighbouring Arab countries by force.245 There were two issues at play 
during the PCC conference in Beirut. The first was skepticism on the part of Arabs that Israel 
was ready to make any reasonable concessions on the issue of refugees, therefore deciding to 
entrench an unwavering position to ensure both Israel and the United Nations did not forget 
displaced peoples.246 The second, and arguably more important facet, was that Palestinian 
refugees were not represented at the conferences by Palestinians, but rather by Arab hosts. These 
states wanted to resettle Palestinian refugees for humanitarian reasons.247 Jordan, Lebanon, 
Egypt, and Syria had a significant responsibility to take care of and represent Palestinians in 
exile in the aforementioned Arab countries.248 The Jordanian, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Syrian 
governments advocated for the return of Palestinian refugees with three goals in mind: deny 
Israel permanence in the region; stamp out the need to care for Palestinian refugees en masse; 
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and test the United Nations to see how well it could stand up to Israel and how effective it could 
be with obstinate mediation. The insistence on the Palestinian refugee issue by Arab delegations 
was adopted in solidarity against Israeli aggression, but also because the United Nations bought 
into the notion of a homogenous Arab delegation that spoke for Palestinians when only 
Indigenous Palestinians truly could.249 Arab delegations could then stand up to Israel while 
repatriating Palestinian refugees out of the respective countries.  
 Israel’s absence at the Beirut conference was not as nefarious at it may first appear. The 
Arab League boycott of Israel was in its infancy in March 1949, and Lebanon joined the Arab 
attempt to halt the economic and territorial expansion of the new Zionist state.250 After Israel 
became a country, all sea, air, and land entrances of Israeli nationals into Arab territories were 
barred.251 This decision facilitated not only the need for PCC discussions to occur in neutral 
territory, but also severely interfered with the wider efforts of UN mediation.252 The Mideast 
Mirror posited that the boycott of Israel was an important moment of grappling for Arabs writ 
large and the United Nations holding meetings in Arab territory with Israel present would have 
been a de facto recognition of Israel’s permanence in the region.253 The choice of the United 
Nations to hold the first conference in Beirut, without Israel present—and knowing Israel could 
not and would not be present—pointed again to internal goals rather than genuine mediation. 
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While more substantive meetings occurred later in 1949, this initial PCC effort was clear 
signposting that the United Nations wanted to get Arabs to back away from refugee insistencies 
before bringing Israel into the picture so discussions of Jerusalem ran more smoothly. In short, 
the Arab League boycott of Israel provided the PCC a chance to talk Arabs down from the 
Palestinian refugee dimension in the hopes of making matters specific to Jerusalem more 
palatable.  
 The PCC’s meeting in Beirut does not receive nearly the same attention as Lausanne in 
the historical record, both in the UN archives and scholarly works. Nevertheless, the conference 
saw Arab governments come together in what the United Nations deemed to be a “probing 
operation.”254 Nobody in the United Nations viewed Beirut as the sole effort of its Holy City-
specific commission. Even before the countries convened in the Lebanese capital there were 
talks of holding another meeting at a neutral location in the near future.255 Both Boisanger and 
Yalcin traveled home after touring capitals in the Mashriq to receive instructions on how to 
proceed, indicating the influence the member countries of the commission had outside the 
auspices of the United Nations.256 Some contemporaries thought the conference conceived an 
“Arab Bloc,” or a coalition of Arab states against the United Nations, but Azcarate vehemently 
refuted this stating how it was Resolution 181 in November 1947 that supposedly caused an 
Arab Bloc, if there even was one.257 Moshe Shertok, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
warned the Beirut conference set a problematic precedent for ensuing negotiations between 
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Arabs and Israelis mediated by the United Nations. The British Ambassador to Iraq argued 
against a meeting of the major Arab players.258 Still, the meetings went ahead. 
 Due to broad Arab insistence on resolving the Palestinian refugee problem before 
discussing any other matters, Jerusalem was a tangential facet of the Beirut conference. A day 
into the conference, Azcarate cabled the Secretary-General to explain that internationalization as 
laid out in Resolution 194 might not be practicable.259 Yalcin similarly reported 
internationalization was impossible due to the Israeli position, no doubt amplified by Beirut’s 
focus on the Palestinian refugee aspect of the commission’s duties.260 The second PCC progress 
report merely noted that the Jerusalem sub-committee “has continued to work actively,” which 
was a veiled statement that little got accomplished in a month of exploration.261  
The Jerusalem Committee was not viewed favourably by the larger PCC. All three PCC 
members held differing views on how the sub-committee should proceed. The United States, for 
instance, suggested joint Israeli-Jordanian sovereignty over the region, while France proposed 
the creation and promotion of a separate currency spearheaded by the Committee.262 Other ideas 
included full internationalization complete with UN forces and international citizenship.263 
Lebanon supported the latter idea, stating that “the citizens of Jerusalem would have Jerusalem 
citizenship, exclusive of any other nationality.”264 “Jerusalem citizenship,” as envisioned at the 
time, was to be administered by the United Nations, circumventing any Palestinian, Arab, or 
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Israeli nationalities for people living in the city.265 Ethridge deemed the French proposal of 
citizenship as “impossible and fantastic,” but worried his opinions would be drowned out by 
Turkish support and “a distinct pro-Arab bias” from Yalcin.266 Still, negotiations between 
Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis were needed before any of these internal musings could be 
enacted.  
 Israel’s transfer of political offices to Jerusalem additionally impeded PCC discussions in 
Beirut regarding internationalization. The moving of Israeli ministries from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem alerted UN authorities, as it ran counter to Resolutions 181 and 194 of an 
internationalized city.267 Having Israeli ministries located in Jerusalem hindered perceptions of 
neutrality. Israeli acts of “sovereignty-building” went against the United Nations’ stated aims for 
the Holy City. They also signalled Israel was not going to concede much in the form of 
negotiations concerning Jerusalem and that results were far from a foregone conclusion.268 
 After Beirut’s proceedings, Willie Snow Ethridge remarked how “nothing was settled 
except that the Arabs would meet with the Israelis somewhere, sometime, to discuss terms for 
peace. There was no hurry, though.”269 Despite this outlook, the United Nations did have some 
tangible aspects to hinge hope upon for an eventual internationalization of the city. David Ben-
Gurion, Israel’s inaugural Prime Minister, noted how there was a distinct difference between 
“Jerusalem” and the “Holy Places.”270 Jerusalem was the entire city, and according to Ben-
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Gurion, the UN was not interested in this broad geographic entity. Instead, what the United 
Nations wanted through internationalization was the protection of the Holy Places, and some just 
happened to be in Jerusalem.271 This Israeli position was held throughout the PCC discussions, 
and challenged the United Nations’ attempt to wrest sovereignty from the new state.272 Arabs, en 
bloc, showed at least tentative support for an internationalized Jerusalem even during the Beirut 
and Lausanne conferences, yet only if such a political structure was promised to be upheld 
against rising Israeli territorial aggressions.273 This support was not so much an endorsement of 
UN plans as it was resistance against Israeli aggressions, with internationalization being a less 
worse option.  
 
The Lausanne Conference 
 Opening on 27 April and running until 15 September, the Lausanne conference was the 
primary contribution of the PCC. Attended by Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, as well as 
Israel, the conference emerged with a better understanding of how to implement the 
internationalization of Jerusalem. The Palestinian refugee question continued to loom large over 
all discussions surrounding Jerusalem. Yet the PCC managed to fulfil the second part of its 
mandate, albeit methodically.  
 Importantly, two Palestinians attended the Lausanne conference. Aziz Shehadeh and 
Nimr al-Hawari were both lawyers in the West Bank who spoke to the situation of Palestinian 
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refugees at Lausanne.274 A notable absence in discussions was the former Mufti of Jerusalem, 
Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who despite a considerable Jerusalem-based following did not send any 
delegates to the PCC meetings until late in the proceedings.275 Al-Hawari and al-Husayni were 
far from allies, with the former accusing the latter of working with Israel during the first Arab-
Israeli war of 1947-49.276 The main preoccupations of the Palestinians present, according to 
Israel, were “property and the reunion of families.”277 The regional politics of Palestinian 
representation fueled Israel’s preference of making peace with Jordan instead of a stateless 
Palestinian body, ensuring a nominal role for the Palestinian delegation in Switzerland.278  
 Following the initial meetings with Arab states in Beirut, the PCC devised the Lausanne 
Protocol to ensure positive movement in UN negotiations. 279 Concerning the Holy City, the 
Lausanne Protocol provided diplomatic separation of the Palestinian refugee crisis and the 
“Jerusalem question.” Lauded as a masterstroke of peacemaking, the document did not make any 
peace; instead, it only served as a piece of paper intending to carry conversations towards peace. 
  The Lausanne protocol obtained the signatures of Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, Syrian 
and Israeli delegations ahead of the second PCC meeting, while Palestinians importantly did not 
sign this document.280 The protocol also included a map marking the geographic partition of 
Resolution 181, including an internationally set-aside Jerusalem, as the basis for conversation.281 
The elation of getting signatures on such an agreement did not permeate all facets of the United 
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Nations, for it was “not altogether encouraging” because it only set out the basis for discussion 
rather than an agreement on any particular points.282  
The Arab signees used the protocol’s inclusion of the map of partition as the basis of 
territorial discussions, including Jerusalem being out of Zionist hands and as evidence to the 
illegality of Israeli settler colonialism.283 The PCC used the unabashed desire for Israeli 
admittance as a member of the United Nations as leverage to get concessions on various talking 
points, albeit without much reduction of entrenchment.284 In exchange for accepting the PCC 
terms of negotiations on principle, Israel obtained full UN membership on 11 May 1949.285 
Neither Arabs nor Israelis viewed the Lausanne Protocol document fondly. While Jerusalem was 
discussed in the Swiss city, it was done with considerable consternation towards the United 
Nations. The multi-pronged discussions coveted by the covenant of Resolution 194 was only the 
purview of the United Nations, while the peoples attending the meetings did not particularly 
enjoy the PCC’s forceful mediation. The agreement of cooperation with the UN commission was 
a vastly different enterprise on paper than it was in practice.286 
 In general, Arabs and Israelis had differing expectations vis-à-vis Lausanne. Arab 
delegations thought of the meetings as “a peace conference;” Israel as “exploratory 
conversations.”287 The United Nations officially referred to Lausanne as “an exchange of views 
between the Israeli and Arab delegations and itself.”288 Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis were 
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finally together to talk, but no one agreed on the subject matter. With the Lausanne Protocol in 
hand, however, the United Nations and the PCC sought to break the deadlock and produce 
results for the General Assembly.  
 From the outset, it was clear the PCC was tethered to the General Assembly and the 
desires of UN member states muddled mediation efforts. Dragoslav Protitch, Principle Director 
of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, wrote to Azcarate days after 
Lausanne talks began about inviting the Vatican and Orthodox patriarchs into discussions 
concerning Jerusalem’s future.289 This was championed primarily by Argentina and Greece: two 
countries that served to benefit from a greater Christian presence in the region.290 Argentina 
continued pressuring Israel on its Jerusalem stances, demanding that Israeli positions on the 
Jerusalem question satisfy the Vatican and the Papal encyclicals.291 Chaim Weizmann, the 
President of Israel, spoke broadly by claiming there was “no real incompatibility” between the 
encyclicals and the “aspirations of the people of Jerusalem.”292 Leaders of Western Christian 
denominations felt the need to speak louder in lieu of the Eastern churches “muzzled under 
centuries of Muslim domination.”293 Much like the letters received by UNSCOP, the PCC 
fielded many requests for a larger Christian presence in the Holy City not only from clergy, but 
also from member states on the General Assembly floor.  
 On 9 May, the Jerusalem Committee circulated a series of three questions to all 
delegations at Lausanne in the hopes of having something concrete and workable for the PCC. 
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The first question asked what measures needed to be taken to ensure the permanence of an 
international regime. The second pondered if the Holy City should be placed “under exclusive 
authority” of the United Nations.294 The third question departed from the notion of corpus 
seperatum, asking: “Or would you prefer that Jerusalem area be divided into Jewish and Arab 
zones in which authority of neighbouring states could be exercised in respect to matters not 
reserved to exclusive competence of international regime.”295 Only Israel responded directly to 
these queries, yet both Arab and Israeli delegations submitted separate notes for Jerusalem 
talks.296 Israel’s proposal affirmed that its transfer of government offices from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem did not go against UN plans if the latter sought to protect the Holy Places in 
Jerusalem, rather than the city itself. Collectively, Arab states rejected this Israeli position citing 
Resolution 194 as justification against continued Zionist territorial grabs.297 Jordan’s proposal, 
specifically, vowed to “preserve full Arab rights in Palestine” and spoke of Abdullah having 
Arab interests at heart rather than Palestinians.298 The idea that the PCC was even considering 
granting sovereignty in Jerusalem to individual nations, however vaguely, was a key moment in 
UN reckonings of both Resolution 181 and 194. While the posing of a question hardly 
constituted an acceptance of failure, the very fact that such an option was circulated to the 
delegations simultaneously indicated how idealistic the General Assembly was and how stagnant 
the talks of internationalization were. Ultimately, Lausanne saw little movement on Jerusalem 
and next to no momentum carrying the commission towards a report to the General Assembly.   
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 What scant aspects of momentum the PCC achieved came from the work of the 
Jerusalem Committee. This committee held talks in Jerusalem with leaders of Muslim, Jewish, 
and Christian communities to better understand and facilitate discussions at the main negotiation 
table.299 In a particularly illuminating meeting, the committee heard Arab delegations were 
“prepared to discuss a scheme” for Jerusalem’s internationalization so long as this was not a 
precursor to the city becoming Israel’s capital.300 Phillippe Benoist, the chairman of the 
Jerusalem committee, rallied Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria behind this stance and further 
homogenized the distinct Arab delegations into a singular entity.301 Aside from Jordan, 
Jerusalem was not a city any of these countries claimed sovereignty over. Jordan, for its part, 
“confined itself to its own statement.”302 By connecting the Palestinian cause with broader Arab 
delegations, the United Nations created a binary of Arabs and Israelis unsuccessfully attempting 
to uncomplicate a terribly complex issue.  
Realities in Jerusalem tangibly influenced the Lausanne conference. In an early June 
meeting, Jordan told the PCC that Israel occupied parts of Jerusalem around the Government 
House, which was neutral territory.303 Arab delegations demanded Israel withdraw from the area 
to stay true to Resolution 194 and to respect the authority of the United Nations.304 Israel 
refused.305 Still, the Jerusalem Committee continued to work “to exhaust all the means at its 
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disposal” despite the floundering success of the conversations.306 The Arab press bluntly 
described the meeting’s progress as “the Lausanne Conference drags on.”307 
 Considering the dearth of meaningful discussions, the PCC paused negotiations at 
Lausanne. Rumours of an impending failure of the UN commission and a resumption of war was 
unpalatable to the United Nations and imperiled the PCC.308 The UN commission was most 
concerned with getting both sides to talk, rather than the substance of those talks.309 These were 
“most damaging and embarrassing” to the commission.310 Despite being halfway through its 
second conference, the UN internationalization of Jerusalem remained elusive. 
Lasting from 1-18 July, the PCC paused discussions at Lausanne. This recess intended to 
give a breather to all involved, and for the parties to recollect themselves in preparation for more 
productive talks.311 Azcarate was against this pause, and stated it was “caused, mainly, by the 
American Government.”312 He also questioned just how united the nations were and the equity 
found not only in Lausanne, but also Lake Success.313 The recess was not a glowing review of 
negotiations, and further dampened spirits for more diplomatic discussions upon the resumption 
of Lausanne.  
 To the dismay of the PCC, secret talks between Israel and Jordan resumed over Jerusalem 
and related matters. Buried in a report from the field to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Cordier 
and Protitch stated that Jordan and Israel came to a private agreement in April 1949 about who 
was to govern which portions of Jerusalem, with only a small swathe of land around the 
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Government House under UN authority.314 Given the fractured nature of the Lausanne talks and 
the lack of meaningful compromise from the United Nations, Israel and Jordan circumvented the 
international organization and handled mediation bilaterally.315 The United Nations’ 
internationalization scheme contravened Israeli-Jordanian interests in the Holy City, and the 
ability for the two nations to negotiate without UN presence (a lack of Palestinian contributions 
aside) further demonstrated the unnecessary nature of continued international mediation.316 
Both Jordan and Israel desired control over Jerusalem, and neither wanted to see the 
United Nations take land already under Jordanian or Israeli control. There was confidence in 
both governments that mediation concerning the city could be achieved without UN 
supervision.317 For Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem was the “test case” for other border questions through 
the United Nations. If internationalization could be defeated, then the territorial questions would 
be considerably tilted in Israel’s favour.318 For Abdullah, his cooperation with Israel came from a 
belief that the United Nations could not deny Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. If 
internationalization was implemented, he believed it “would give Jerusalem to the Jews.”319 The 
Jordanian king also had territorial designs for Jerusalem, which generally perturbed Palestinians 
who thought Abdullah used his status as an Arab to improperly represent Palestinian causes in 
Jerusalem.320 Israeli-Jordanian collusion, with Jerusalem as its linchpin, jeopardized UN 
aspirations in the Holy City.   
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  Another setback struck the PCC during its Lausanne recess in early July: the resignation 
of U.S. representative Mark Ethridge. Finding his replacement proved difficult. Paul Porter was 
shoulder-tapped by U.S. president Harry Truman.321 Porter had no background in Palestinian 
politics, had not been kept abreast of any of the recent developments, and possessed no real 
desire to even participate in the negotiations.322 His delayed arrival stalled the work of the PCC 
emerging from its recess.323 Ultimately, Porter’s priority was to support the U.S. government, not 
the United Nations.324 His initial report to the U.S. government outlined that “Preliminary 
impressions leave me dubious as to prospect of important changes of attitude as result [of the] 
recess.”325 From his perspective, “We [the United States] may be forced to take initiative and I 
want instructions as specific as possible.”326 Such thinking paralleled internal UN conversations 
that success at Lausanne was “primarily on Washington and London,” rather than on the actual 
pertinent Swiss negotiations.327 The United Nations was continuing to hang hopes upon some of 
its equitable members rising above the others. As negotiations began anew, there was little 
notable change regarding the UN internationalization of Jerusalem or the tactics employed to 
garner results.  
 The tone of the Lausanne meeting shifted after its three-week break. Azcarate mused that 
it may be time “to close this ‘general debate’” and shift into “discussions article by article.”328 
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The Principle Secretary also alluded to the stretched-out nature of the PCC and how the 
multitude of tasks on the agenda created a paralysis for the commissioners and on the overall 
movement of meaningful discussion.329 On 28 July 1949, Azcarate noted to Cordier that, as the 
United Nations’ Municipal Commissioner in Jerusalem, he was “rather in the dark about the 
constitutional aspects” of the Jerusalem question.330 He found it impossible to separate Jerusalem 
from other territorial disputes in Palestine/Israel.331   
 As Jerusalem slipped from UN grasp, the PCC refocused on the position of Special 
Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem in the wake of Lausanne’s lack of success.332 In 
September 1949, the UN Secretary-General appointed an established Colombian diplomat, 
Alberto Gonzalez Fernandez, as the new de facto mayor for Jerusalem.333 To the particular 
consternation of Israel, the United Nations tasked Gonzalez Fernandez to oversee the 
implementation of a permanent international regime in Jerusalem—a task still beyond legal UN 
jurisdiction.334 The Columbian diplomat, much like Harold Evans sixteen months previously, 
never took up the post, citing personal reasons and his ailing wife as reasons for spurning “so 
high a distinction.”335 Lasting only nine days on the job, and never completing any task of note 
related to the position, Gonzalez Fernandez left the United Nations without a full-time municipal 
commissioner once again. Released three days after Gonzalez Fernandez’s resignation, but 
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obviously written before and unedited, the fourth progress report of the PCC stated: “the 
Commission is convinced that Dr. Gonzalez Fernandez will receive, on the part of the Arab and 
Israeli authorities, the assistance necessary for the accomplishment of his task.”336 Even the 
United Nations could not keep up to date with its activities.  
 The PCC’s fourth progress report notably included a draft statute for the Holy City.337 
Meant to complement Gonzalez Fernandez’s appointment, the draft statute stood as the PCC’s 
lone success.338 It facilitated internationalization once UN-led negotiations found a “final 
solution” to territorial questions, at least according to Azcarate.339 The PCC released the draft 
instrument on 1 September, receiving immediate backlash from Arabs and Israelis alike.340 The 
Palestine Post reported that, if implemented, the UN instrument would lead to complete and 
everlasting authority for the international organization in the Holy City. The Jerusalem-based 
Israeli newspaper simultaneously assured its readers that the draft statute required the approval 
of the General Assembly before becoming codified.341 Israeli diplomat Michael Comay 
described the UN document on Jerusalem as “one of the gargoyles on the medieval cathedrals” 
and thus uncomely.342 In a press release on 16 September 1949, Moshe Shertok called the 
document “its own condemnation.”343 Eban recognized the PCC’s draft statute was in 
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communion with Resolution 194, but understood its illusory nature.344 After its release, Israel 
was “in a very fighting mood against all things ‘internationalization.’”345   
 What the draft instrument demarcated, in reality, was the presentable work of the PCC to 
the General Assembly in compliance with the latter’s Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948. As 
obligated, the PCC presented its suggestions for making Jerusalem a “permanent international 
regime” and establishing UN authority around the Holy City before the UN organ. The PCC’s 
draft statute for Jerusalem recommended all decisions pertaining to the governmental structure to 
be made by and upheld through the General Assembly.346 This disregard for the governmental 
sovereignty of Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis engendered remarks from Shertok. The Israeli 
foreign minister questioned why the PCC held meetings about Jerusalem if it was going to 
disregard everything said against internationalization and produce an “anachronistic and 
incongruous” document.347 The PCC’s draft statute also established the United Nations’ “full and 
permanent authority in Jerusalem.”348 Eban, for his part, asked “how, when, and from whom” 
UN authority was acquired, let alone the permanence of this self-declared authority.349 In 
essence, the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations stated that writing control into a resolution 
or a draft instrument did not give the international organization the authority to govern 
Jerusalem.350 The lack of legal sovereignty acquisition also rendered the PCC, the conciliation 
efforts, and the draft instrument moot. The draft instrument, then, was not a product of 
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diplomatic negotiations, or the fruits from Beirut of Lausanne. Instead, it was the express 
imperially-inclined approach to peacemaking the United Nations adopted to attain the results it 
was instructed to produce rather than any real efforts at meaningful mediation.   
 The United Nations grappled with the concept of internationalization again as the release 
of the PCC’s draft statute engendered a fresh wave of discontent. For the UN, given its mandate 
in Jerusalem, fulfillment of internationalization requirements necessitated submitting the 
document to the General Assembly without Arab or Israeli consent.351 For Azcarate, the draft 
statute was meant to “reconcile the establishment of an international regime” in Jerusalem. 352 
Criticisms voiced by Israelis were done “pour les besoins de la cause” (for the needs of the 
cause).353 In other words, the draft statute’s intention was to complete a bureaucratic task and 
appease its draftees at the General Assembly rather than people in the city affected by the words 
contained within. Ensuing complaints from the delegations were thus shared out of obligation, 
rather than actual discontent with the UN plan. Such thinking perpetuated a continued skewing 
of local desires in lieu of UN ones.  
Once the PCC submitted its draft statute to the General Assembly, Azcarate privately 
noted the lack of sovereignty considerations throughout the drafting process of the document. 
“For tactical reasons,” he stated, “the Commission considered wiser not to deal in an open and 
direct way with the question of sovereignty.” It was “obvious” that despite this omission, there 
was still “respect” for local governments.354 Azcarate added that the UN commission ought to 
visit the city after five months away to see the changes and understand the realities on the 
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ground.355 Combined with the lack of Palestinian, Arab, or Israeli opportunities to comment on 
the actual draft instrument, the absence from Jerusalem further solidified the notion that the 
United Nations operated under a self-serving mandate long before a conciliatory one. The 
members of the PCC did view themselves as representing their respective countries more than 
the United Nations after all.356 
 Even with the draft instrument in the hands of the General Assembly, the United Nations 
was not finished with the internationalization of Jerusalem. Eventually the PCC faded into 
relative blurriness as other organs of the United Nations took up the Jerusalem cause in its 
absence.357 The presentation of the draft instrument fulfilled the requirement laid out in 
paragraph eight of Resolution 194, thus officially closing the PCC’s work regarding 
Jerusalem.358 By 1951, it was already surmised the PCC’s efforts were in vain and that “the 
implementation of that resolution is impossible,” referring in part to the internationalization of 
Jerusalem.359 As the General Assembly got hold of the draft instrument, a whole new array of 
questions arose about how the UN internationalization of Jerusalem should work.  
The few scholars studying the Palestine Conciliation Commission have opined various 
theories as to why the United Nations mediation efforts failed. Saadia Touval notes errors in 
tactics, international commission hurdles, U.S. discombobulation, and a lack of talented staff to 
assist the commission, as well as the difficulties of internationalizing a city and repatriating 
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refugees as standalone issues.360 Ilan Pappé cites the joint Jordanian-Israeli opposition to 
internationalization which sunk the commission, limited the scope of discussions, and that the 
international community, outside of religious figures, did not have much stake in who governed 
the city.361 David Forsythe suggests that the unimaginative approaches and tunnel vision of the 
top-down mandated requirements hamstrung the commission which never stood a legitimate 
chance of success.362 Neil Caplan posits four reasons for the demise: confusion arising from 
three members on the commission rather than one; lack of mobilization from home governments 
of the commission members; unfit persons chosen to the commission; and tactical errors by the 
commissioners themselves due to a lack of experience in Mashriq peacemaking.363  
These are all legitimate points to make, and all contributed to the demise of the PCC. Yet 
these authors omit crucial aspects in their respective analyses: namely, that true consultation with 
Palestinians, Jordanians, or Israelis never occupied a top priority for anyone within the United 
Nations machinery. Instead, forceful tactics of mediation were to blame for the lack of success 
found in the ideas from Lake Success. The PCC was merely another international commission 
undertaken where hope was dashed soon after conception due to the individualism of the 
countries comprising the commission.364  
Placing fault in individual nations within the United Nations points not only to the 
Eurocentrism and Western-leaning analysis of historical agency more generally, but also to the 
fractured state of UN affairs in the early stages of the organization’s efforts. Still, the 
explanations of the authors are a reminder of how dependant the United Nations was on the 
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inequity of its member states, and that the goals of the broader UN infrastructure did not always 
align with that of its constituent parts. That the PCC engaged in conferences at all was merely a 
mirage to wider intentions of imperial peacemaking, and placated to perceived correct 
formalities of conflict resolution. For if it truly valued the contributions voiced during the 
conferences, plans towards internationalization would have been quickly halted or at the very 
least drastically altered. Instead, UN persistence on its original ideas indicated that Jerusalem 
was going to be internationalized regardless of local opinion. And yet, the initiative did not 
achieve the results the United Nations desired. This setback did not chime the death knell for 
aspirant internationalization. With more complexity came new ideas of how to enforce a regime 
onto Jerusalem. While the PCC watched proceedings from afar, the United Nations embarked on 


















Fading into Obscurity:  
The Jerusalem Question after the Palestine Conciliation Commission 
 
 In June 1951, well after the Palestine Conciliation Commission fulfilled its duties to the 
United Nations on the Jerusalem front, Pablo de Azcarate wrote to Andrew Cordier about the 
commission and its place in conciliatory actions. The creation of the PCC incorrectly impressed 
that “real peace negotiations” could lead to “real peace.”365 Hamstrung by “utterly outdated 
resolutions,” the United Nations now tackled the question of Jerusalem from a different angle.366 
For Azcarate, this necessitated a “more realistic approach.”367 The commission took an imperial 
approach to mediation to the double detriment of its chances for success and the UN image in the 
Mashriq. The United Nations, he surmised, needed to start over.  
 This chapter situates the continued efforts of the United Nations to internationalize 
Jerusalem in late 1949 and into the early 1950s, primarily through Resolution 303 and the so-
called “Garreau Plan,” named after the President of the Trusteeship Council Roger Garreau. The 
adoption of UN Resolution 303 in December 1949 was the last main effort of the United Nations 
to internationalize Jerusalem and the Garreau Plan transferred this task from the PCC to the 
Trusteeship Council. The United Nations employed the Trusteeship Council to oversee 
internationalization as the rapidly-changing political situation on the ground in Jerusalem 
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Responses to the Draft Statute for Jerusalem 
The PCC’s publication of the Draft Statute for Jerusalem was a crucial moment in the 
United Nations’ plans to internationalize the Holy City. Tensions rose high enough for the PCC 
to release an official statement on 9 November 1949 responding to criticisms that the 
internationalization plan was antithetical to the UN charter, rejected local autonomy, and was 
ultimately undemocratic.368 The PCC’s main riposte was deadpan insofar as it undertook 
“extensive consultation” with local representatives.369 Two articles stood out as particularly 
problematic. Article 16 explained that the Holy Places were to be “placed under the exclusive 
control of the commissioner,” who in turn received all authority and legitimacy through the 
General Assembly.370 Local autonomy was absent, and instead placed into UN administrative 
hands. Article 25, the final installment in the UN instrument, noted how the international 
organization could amend or revise the clauses set forth if need be, with no reference to 
consultation with Palestinians, Arabs, or Israelis about potential alternations.371 In other words, 
the United Nations continued its imperial ways of being by enforcing a statute upon the region 
which had limited consultation in its construction and could be altered without any further direct 
communication with the parties involved.372  
 The demise of the PCC’s proposal rested in the commission’s insistence on moving away 
from full internationalization. The PCC’s plan involved control over select regions of the city, 
with a focus on the Holy Places, frustrating UN members calling for full unequivocal 
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internationalization and countries who wished to avoid excessive meddling in the city. For full-
internationalization supporters, the PCC’s plan was too weak and allowed for too much political 
maneuvering, specifically by Israel and Jordan. For those backing partial internationalization, the 
blunt rejection of the draft statute by Jordan and Israel—the two countries allotted quasi-
sovereignty over sections of the city—caused equal alarm for the plan’s longevity.373 
Furthermore, the bickering between member states on the General Assembly floor and 
accusations of wide-sweeping political machinations hindered any semblance of international 
unity on the subject and empowered suspicion about whether the United Nations could enact 
internationalization in and around Jerusalem.374 
A report by the United Nations Ad Hoc Political Committee, issued on 7 December 1949, 
returned to Resolution 181’s proposal that Jerusalem and its environs be governed by the 
Trusteeship Council.375 The reintroduction of the Trusteeship Council was alarming as it was the 
initial governmental concept forwarded by the United Nations and was antithetical to local 
desires. This original body of the United Nations served much the same functions as the League 
of Nations’ mandate system. Despite a reworking of the machinery and a different name, the 
branch had the same imperial purpose.376 More precisely, the Trusteeship Council was 
responsible for providing “tutelage” to territories deemed not yet ready for independence by a 
majority of the United Nations’ member-states.377 Trygve Lie stated how vital the establishment 
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of the Trusteeship System was for the overall functionality of the United Nations, and that the 
international organization “can never be complete without it.”378 In 1945, as the United Nations 
was in formation, there were invitations for the larger mandatory powers “to place their 
mandates under the trusteeship system.”379 This novel form of governance disguised as 
trusteeship gave the appearance that a part of Palestine, and Jerusalem specifically, was being 
administered in a more humanitarian kind of way.380 Yet the underlying motivation behind 
trusteeship was to continue the imperial and colonial framework that gripped the Jerusalem 
project from the outset.   
 After the PCC submitted its draft statute and called for a permanent international regime 
to be established in Jerusalem, another vote took place at the United Nations to determine the 
direction of the Holy City. During this meeting, various delegations questioned the quality of 
work undertaken by the PCC and how to better prepare Jerusalem for eternal UN governance. 
Australia thought Resolution 181 should be closer to the heart of the matter. El Salvador vouched 
for a widening of the geographic scope of the international regime. The Soviet Union, for its 
part, stated that the Trusteeship Council should produce its own draft statute, “delete” references 
to Resolution 194, and move closer towards trusteeship.381 These discussions demonstrated that 
the work of the PCC did not curry favour with the broader UN community and the General 
Assembly set about remedying this situation through another vote. The vote to re-establish the 
Trusteeship Council as the Administering Authority of Jerusalem, and to draft its future articles 
of governance, was passed thirty-five to thirteen, with eleven abstentions.382  
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On 9 December 1949, the United Nations announced its third resolution speaking to the 
internationalization of Jerusalem in just over two years. UN Resolution 303 called for a new 
draft statute to be prepared by the Trusteeship Council. The Garreau Plan ignored the work 
completed by the PCC and the fulfillment of Resolution 194.383 The December 1949 resolution 
called for “omitting now inapplicable provisions” and also noted that Resolution 181, the 
original partition document, should anchor the Trusteeship Council’s efforts.384 Only three 
countries voted against this resolution: the United Kingdom, the United States, and Israel. Had 
Jordan been a UN member, it likely would have opposed the motion as well.385  
That Resolution 181, not Resolution 194, formed the basis for Resolution 303 was not 
subject to a glowing review of the PCC.386 In January 1950, Garreau noted the Archbishop of 
Canterbury’s view that a different plan needed to “break the present deadlock” and find 
acceptance for an international enclave, which had yet to be achieved.387 In the hopes of avoiding 
further UN embarrassment, the PCC’s termination was also internally determined because of its 
“obsolete and unimplementable terms of reference.”388 Even though the United Nations voted to 
keep the commission active, its role in brokering peace became secondary.389 The PCC, for its 
part, consigned the fulfillment of its mandated role and saw the enactment of Resolution 303 as 
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going back to the original UN plan and ignoring its input.390 Its efforts, then, were not accepted, 
but also not completely in vain. The PCC determined the stance the United Nations did not want 
to take.   
A major voice in the pro-internationalization camp was Lebanon’s Charles Malik. Guided 
by the recently passed Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in which he was a major draftee, 
the Lebanese diplomat viewed internationalization and the willingness of the United Nations to 
put pressure on states opposed to the plan as a major test of Resolution 303’s differing 
approach.391 Malik was critical of Israel for not only violating the terms of Resolution 194, but 
also the United Nations for allowing a member-state to defy its intentions.392 Malik called for a 
showcase for UN strength by tightening its grip on the geopolitical realities in Jerusalem.393 
Malik worked in close tandem with the Vatican and Catholic-leaning Latin American countries 
as the vote against the PCC’s proposal drew near.394 His efforts were instrumental in conjuring 
up enough international support for Resolution 303 and the re-engagement with Jerusalem from 
a more total-internationalization lens.395 Both the Vatican and Latin American countries 
supported a UN proposal placing a Christian governor in the Holy City.396 As Arab countries on 
the whole saw the potential for resistance against Zionism and welcomed global collaboration 
and solidarity, more pragmatic diagnoses from the United States and Britain squashed this hope 
by not committing to the enforcement of any full internationalization against Israeli or Jordanian 
wishes.397   
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The transfer from PCC to the Trusteeship Council did not appease affected parties. The 
Jordanian government reported to the United Nations that no person affiliated with the 
organization would be issued visas: a sign the organization was not welcomed in the region, 
officially or unofficially.398 Israel, for its part, continued threatening to move more governmental 
offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and did not see the United Nations being much of a 
roadblock.399 Furthermore, Israel reaffirmed its position on the internationalization of Jerusalem, 
despite UN decision-making.400 David Ben-Gurion, in a speech at the Knesset on 5 December 
1949, stated: “Jerusalem is the very heart of the State of Israel… Jews will sacrifice themselves 
for Jerusalem no less than Englishmen for London, Russians for Moscow, or Americans for 
Washington.”401 Jerusalem, for Zionists, was definitively Israeli territory.  
The Trusteeship Council’s re-emergence onto the Jerusalem scene was met with 
criticism. Many of these were directed at Roger Garreau. The continued efforts by the United 
Nations came to be known as the “Garreau Plan.” As President of the Trusteeship Council, 
Garreau personified UN internationalization efforts in Jerusalem.402 From the outset, the Iraqi 
representative Mohammad Fadhel al-Jamali accused Garreau of trying to “please all groups but 
none [were] pleased.”403 Various delegations carried al-Jamali’s perspective.404 Letters addressed 
to Garreau wondered whether the United Nations had “the moral and military force” to realize 
internationalization. Jerusalem could not be “cut up,” according to prominent New York-based 
 
398 Incoming Cablegram, from Jerusalem, 15 December 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, UNA.  
399 Incoming Cablegram, From Jerusalem, 13 December 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, UNA. 
400 Incoming Cablegram, From Jerusalem, 21 December 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, UNA; and Avi 
Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 62-63.  
401 “Statement by D. Ben-Gurion, 5 December 1949,” in Ruth Lapidoth and Moshe Hirsch, eds. The Arab-Israeli 
Conflict and its Resolution: Selected Documents (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 105. 
402 Olivier Danino, “La France et la Question de Jerusalem, 3 Avril 1949—7 Juin 1967,” Relations Internationales 
No. 122 (2005): 53.  
403 Incoming Cablegram from Geneva, 6 January 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, UNA. 





minister Charles Bridgeman.405 Letters from Christian-based leaders also mused that a stronger 
Christian presence in the Holy City would surely bring peace.406  
The most direct voice against internationalization in early 1950 came from the American 
Christian Palestine Committee (ACPC), who vehemently called for a cessation of all intentions 
towards an UN-governed Holy City. It must be stated that ACPC was a Christian-Zionist 
organization and a key facet of U.S.-based Protestant support for the Zionist cause. These words, 
then, came from a desire to see Jerusalem be in Israeli hands.407 ACPC members opined that the 
Holy Places should be the only concern for the United Nations. In their view, both Jordan and 
Israel would not infringe upon the safety of these sites.408 The ACPC letters, moreover, 
castigated the United Nations’ top-down approach for disregarding residents of Jerusalem as well 
as the individualism of member states.409  
Various Arab governments and representatives were opportunistically vocal in the first 
quarter of 1950 as the Trusteeship Council hunkered into position. King Abdullah of Jordan re-
engaged with notions of being perceived as the sole representative of Palestinians. While still 
very much against internationalization, he denounced other Arab governments seeking to 
undermine his aspirations for the city and vision of Arab-Israeli peace.410 Abdullah’s allusions of 
being the de facto voice of all Arab peoples echoed those of his father, who initiated the so-
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called Arab revolt of 1916. Husain ibn Ali, from the Husain-McMahon correspondence of 1915-
16, adopted Arab unity as an anti-Ottoman strategy to extend his Hashemite dynasty’s own 
imperial grasp in the Mashriq.411 In the aftermath of World War I and in partial step with the 
Husain-McMahon correspondence, Britain placed members of the Hashemite family on thrones 
in its newly formed mandates of Transjordan and Iraq against the will of local majorities.412  
“Emotion tensions” and the prospects of violence concerned the United Nations. Garreau 
received a letter on 23 February 1950, warning that if his stance on the Jerusalem was not 
changed, “he would be shot ‘like a dog.’”413 This letter, sent by the Palestine Arab Terrorist 
Organization, evoked memories of Count Bernadotte’s assassination. The letter, which arrived 
from Egypt, got a prompt response from the Egyptian representative to the Trusteeship Council, 
who promised to investigate the matter.414 Israel continued its move of government offices to 
Jerusalem and named the city its capital in direct defiance of UN resolutions. Meanwhile, Jordan 
did the same by claiming sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the West Bank.415 The 
Trusteeship Council thus responded to amassing pressures with an alternative draft statute for 
Jerusalem in April 1950. But, much like all other UN efforts, its plan was anything but a well-
accepted piece of legislation.  
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The Trusteeship Council’s Draft Statute for Jerusalem  
Released on 4 April 1950, the Trusteeship Council’s draft statute represented another UN 
attempt to impose an exogenous international regime upon Jerusalem. Longer and more in depth 
than its predecessor in September 1949, this iteration made only passing reference to the PCC or 
Resolution 194. Instead, it used the original partition plan of 1947 as its base.416 There were 
notable distinctions aside from the drastic shifts within the UN officialdom. The governor of the 
city, who was to be appointed by the United Nations, was to only take directives from this most 
recent statute and from the Trusteeship Council.417 This allowed the United Nations to appoint a 
governor for the city, making the governor’s overseers a quasi-imperial branch of the 
organization.418 The 1950 statute gave Jerusalem a legal personality flowing through the United 
Nations itself, rather than any inkling of self-determination.419 Furthermore, it imposed that the 
United Nations held sway over the city and its residents for ten years, barring any change made 
by the Trusteeship Council.420 Only after a decade could the local population hold a referendum, 
but the procedure of that referendum was to be determined by the Trusteeship Council and be 
subject to alteration.421 The April 1950 statute, as evidenced by previous efforts, limited the 
chances of Jerusalem ever reaching a stage where self-government could have been actively and 
effectively promoted.422 Even the linkage to trusteeship was dubious. The only way Jerusalem fit 
the mold of other regions within the Trusteeship Council’s purview was that Palestine was once 
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under the mandate’s system. It was as if the United Nations pretended the British mandate still 
existed, or at the very least still held legitimacy.423  
 News of the 1950 statute’s release was met with “a sense of unreality,” reported the Arab 
News Agency in Geneva.424 Neither the United Nations nor the members of the Trusteeship 
Council were positioned to take any realistic action on the ground. Key UN members returned to 
Lake Success, citing “difficulties” in performing UN-sanctioned duties in Jerusalem.425 The Arab 
press jabbed the United Nations, claiming the transfer of Jerusalem to the Trusteeship Council 
was “an evident failure” of one of the PCC’s main tasks.426 The Soviet Union, which supported 
Resolution 303, recanted a week later after recognizing that the 1950 statute went against the 
desires of local populations.427 This was viewed negatively by both al-Jamali and Ahmed Bey 
Shokeiry, the Syrian representative on the PCC, as votes of the Soviet satellite states would no 
longer be in favour of internationalization, severely dwindling chances of its success.428 
Israel opposed the 1950 statute, noting how its “impracticability” was on “the minds of 
every honest member of the Council.”429 It released a robust critique of the United Nations in 
May 1950. Presented at the Seventh Session of the Trusteeship Council, Israel shared misgivings 
with the United Nations’ unwavering determination to deny the citizens of Jerusalem self-
determination. Israel’s argument against internationalization was twofold. First, global interest in 
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Jerusalem centered around the Holy Places.430 Israel saw no need to infringe upon the 
sovereignty of the entire city when only select portions and specific sites were of interest.431 
Elsewhere, Israel called the 1950 statute “extremist and illusionary.”432 The second, and more 
problematic facet of its argument, was that internationalization weakened Israel and subjected it 
to be overwhelmed by neighbouring Arab countries. This “David vs Goliath” myth, integral to 
Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine, featured in Israeli arguments with the United Nations 
before. Israeli and global Zionist concerns of the “encirclement by Arab forces” remained well 
into 1950.433 Despite the success of Zionist military campaigns in the late 1940s, one pundit 
vouching for continued U.S. support of Israel claimed that “this does not mean the Arabs will be 
forever incapable of ganging up effectively.”434  
The strongest voice of the broader Arab position on the 1950 statute came from Dr. al-
Jamali, the sole delegate from an Arab country to feature on the Trusteeship Council. The Iraqi 
representative eloquently expressed why Arabs on the whole were in a difficult position vis-à-vis 
internationalization.435 In speaking with the Baghdad-based newspaper Al-Zaman, al-Jamali 
criticized the United Nations’ approach towards Zionism and claimed the “leniency” shown by 
the UN members for the Zionist cause made any internationalization attempt “impossible.”436 
Later in the article, the representative from Iraq outlined the parameters of his country’s support 
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for internationalization. Namely, no section of Jerusalem could come under Zionist control; 
Palestinian Arabs must be able to return to the city; and UN motivations cannot be “a screen for 
the extension of Zionist influence.”437 Iraq’s support, then, was predicated on and heavily 
influenced by the desire to see Jerusalem remain Palestinian, or at least Arab, but not Israeli. Iraq 
even submitted a proposal for the installment of a UN representative to the city to maintain 
stability as the Trusteeship Council settled into its role.438 The crux of the Iraqi recommendation 
was that the United Nations could not leave Jerusalem vacant lest Israel take full control of the 
city.439 If the United Nations guaranteed the Palestinian right of return for refugees, as outlined 
in Resolution 194, Jerusalem did not have to be an entirely Palestinian or Arab city. Simply, 
people came before cities.440  
Voices within the United Nations also expressed opinions of the ever-changing landscape 
at the advent of the new statute. Writing to the Secretary-General in June 1950, Andrew Cordier 
and Dragoslav Protitch mused that support for internationalization was strong, but primarily 
from politically ineffective religious figures and non-state organizations.441 The two senior 
members of the UN staff also warned Trygve Lie that the situation in Jerusalem was, on the 
whole, “orderly.”442 Any movements towards internationalization threw such stability into 
jeopardy. A UN press official, H.A. Fisher, candidly remarked that most people got Jerusalem 
wrong and failed to grasp the wide-sweeping ramifications of UN involvement in the city for 
 
437 “No Doubt,” Mideast Mirror, 15 April 1950. Page 9.  
438 Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places, Statute for 
Jerusalem, Egypt: Proposal Submitted by the Delegation of Iraq, 81st Meeting, 4 April 1950, AG-021 fonds, S-0504-
0004-0003 FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, UNA. 
439 Ibid.. 
440 “Jerusalem Refugees Return Plan,” Mideast Mirror, 1 April 1950. Page 5.  
441 Report on the Various Organs Dealing with the Palestine Question, to the Secretary-General from A.W. Cordier 






Palestinian, Arab and Israeli paradigms.443 Fisher opined that the popular perception of Arab 
aggression was not reality; rather, Palestinians fighting for Jerusalem was in opposition to “an 
act of Zionist aggression.”444  
The Trusteeship Council’s 1950 statute doubled down on the problematic and pervasive 
imperialism inherent in the UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem from the outset. What made 
the Garreau plan even more harmful was its debates being held on the General Assembly floor 
rather than with delegations affected by the governance of Jerusalem, namely Palestinians, 
Jordanians, Egyptians, and Israelis. And when discussions were held with relevant delegations, 
the feedback was far from complimentary. This reaction should not have come as a surprise. 
Only in the later stages of proceedings did UN personnel, like Cordier, Protitch, and Fisher, 
begin to understand the misgivings. The PCC determined that full internationalization was not 
agreeable with Palestinians, Jordanians, or Israelis. This reality was promptly ignored by the 
United Nations who shielded its eyes from the unfortunate news, shunned the messenger, and 
tried again. Stubbornness, however, yielded poor results, and led to a further gulf in trust towards 
the organization in the Mashriq.   
 
After the Statute and Into Oblivion 
The Trusteeship Council’s draft statute of April 1950 was the last serious effort made by 
the United Nations to enforce internationalization in and around Jerusalem. The intervening 
months and years saw official and unofficial backpedaling. Years of efforts and numerous 
resolutions were reduced to little more than a collection of intentions with little affirmative 
 







action. While the goal of internationalization faded into obscurity, a few moments stood out as 
beacons of its demise.  
 Still a functional member of the United Nations, the PCC wrote to Trygve Lie in 
September 1950 outlining its stance on the stagnation facing Jerusalem. The PCC stressed its 
consultation with local authorities and reiterated its conclusion that the United Nations could 
not—and should not—force full internationalization upon Jerusalem.445 The commission thought 
Arabs, generally, were willing to accept the international enclave on principle, only if such a 
regime was guaranteed. Conversely, the PCC restated how Israel was against internationalization 
beyond the protection of specific Holy Places.446 The PCC voiced considerable consternation 
against the directions of 1950 and the ignorance of its own work by the UN, as its efforts were 
undertaken to “reconcile” the wishes of the General Assembly and the people affected by this 
decision.447 Going back to 1948, it was envisaged that an interstitial “constituent” authority in the 
city would morph into the “supreme administrative authority” before long.448 The PCC, having 
completed its work and spoken with people in and influenced by the city, attempted in vain to 
impress the idea that this notion was not tangible—not then, not now, and probably not ever.  
 Gripped by melancholy, UN officials contemplated lessons learned. A draft 
supplementary report produced several staggering statements running counter to previous UN 
actions. Although redacted, there was initial mention of how pressures by the “great powers” to 
expedite this process had to be challenged “on ground of morality and equity” and that the 
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United Nations’ “efficacy remains open to the most serious doubts.”449 The draft’s unknown 
author noted the problematic framework of using terminology such as “question” and “problem” 
as it related to Jerusalem as both implied a solution was akin to scientific trial and error.450 The 
United Nations viewed itself as the missing piece to a puzzle it created. This skewed its 
perception of what the so-called peace process was, let alone its role in the proceedings. “In 
Palestine,” the UN draft supplementary report declared, “the United Nations is faced not with a 
mathematical problem but with a historical process.”451  
 Arabs also felt as though the plan for UN internationalization was on its last legs. By 10 
June 1950, the Arab press reported that the internationalization idea was “virtually dead” and “a 
forlorn hope.”452 Despite all non-Palestinian Arab countries vying for internationalization aside 
from Jordan, the latter’s continued exclusion and refusal to meet with the Trusteeship Council to 
discuss matters hindered the prospects of the idea considerably, especially considering 
Abdullah’s perceived role as the Arab voice in Western imaginations.453 The Arab-based press 
also alluded to the ease at which newspapers in the United States picked up the Zionist 
position.454 The American Zionist Council and Abba Eban worked both the U.S. government and 
other non-state actors to keep international support for internationalization at bay.455 This was 
confirmed just a few days later when a vote in the Trusteeship Council recognizing the 
unimplementable nature of internationalization carried by a count of nine to one, with one 
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abstention.456 The termination of the 1950 statute, the Garreau Plan, and Resolution 303, 
remarked Hussein Rouchdy of Syria, “came as no surprise.”457 By early 1951, Israel claimed the 
plan for internationalization had been “put in the waste-paper basket.”458 The UN-led idea of 
internationalization was deemed to be, with helpful hindsight in tow, “impossible” from the 
outset.459  
 These sentiments were confirmed in December 1950, when a few events pushed the faint 
chance of internationalization off the precipice. As the General Assembly returned to the so-
called Jerusalem question, work began afresh with little enthusiasm.460 A Swedish draft 
resolution aimed to put less pressure on the United Nations in finding a solution to the 
“Jerusalem question,” which Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria saw as an intentional 
shirking of responsibilities.461 Israel, for its part, thought the Swedish resolution was “a fair and 
practical expression” of the region’s wishes to see the religious sites safeguarded while also 
ensuring the city remained in local hands.462 Jordan’s Tuqan Bey noted how this resolution 
benefited Israel, “but would give nothing to the Arabs.”463 Ultimately, the Swedish resolution 
failed to attain the two-thirds majority required to pass.464 Thereafter, the United Nations reduced 
the budget for the “establishment of a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area” by 
$8 million through Resolution 468 on 14 December 1950.465  
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 The conclusive unofficial end of internationalization efforts came following the 
assassination of one of its fiercest opponents. King Abdullah of Jordan was killed outside of al-
Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 20 July 1951 by a disgruntled Palestinian.466 Political 
maneuvering and speculations about motive aside, the death of the Jordanian king not only 
severely altered the political landscape of the country, but also the overall outlook of life in the 
Mashriq for colonizing forces.467 Despite a scheduled meeting between Abdallah and Israeli 
government officials the following day, the assassination was not thought to be motivated by the 
Hashemite’s cozying up with Zionists; instead, inter-Arab rivalries were most likely to blame.468 
While the United Nations was torn on whether or not the assassination improved the chances of 
forcing an enclave onto Jerusalem, Azcarate regarded the assassination as a “severe set-back” for 
the prospects of success.469  
The UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem then became dormant. Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, and Yemen penned a joint complaint in 1953 to the United Nations for not 
keeping its promise to make Jerusalem an international zone.470 In late 1954, these same six 
countries wrote to the Secretary-General, calling for the resolutions of the late 1940s to actually 
mean something.471 Delegations voiced that the sending of ambassadors by UN-member states to 
Jerusalem, instead of Tel Aviv, disregarded the resolutions penned concerning the city’s 
internationalization.472 The United Nations responded with a muted statement that Western states 
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who sent ambassadors to Jerusalem did not reflect the stated aims of internationalization, but did 
little to actually rectify the situation.473 
What the waning days of the United Nations’ involvement with Jerusalem showed was 
more continuation than novelty. UN actions maintained an imperial lean. And once there was an 
inkling the international regime could not just be forced upon the region, the General Assembly 
quickly moved along to other pursuits. Only the commissions and people directly ordered to deal 
with Jerusalem had the patience to do anything worthwhile. The rest of the United Nations 
indicated the truer intentions of the organization: it would be nice to control Jerusalem, but not at 
the expense of much effort. The PCC determined internationalization would not be accepted by 
Palestinians, Jordanians, or Israelis. That should have ended the United Nations’ involvement. 
Instead, the organization dismissed the commission, threw out the work completed in the field 
through various conferences, and reverted back to full internationalization. Jerusalem again 
transformed into a place of imagination, rather than a lived reality, as it became bogged down in 
incessant, non-consensual diplomacy which appeased imperialists cosplaying as well-intentioned 
global overseers.  
  
 








The United Nations, through its efforts to internationalize Jerusalem, tried to transform 
the peace process into a peace event. Yet the international organization could not bring about its 
own brand of imperialism masquerading as reconciliation into the fold. The attempted 
internationalization of Jerusalem stands not so much as a mistake as an intentional choice to 
meddle in the early stages of the Israeli-Palestinian and Zionist-Arab conflicts with self-serving 
aspirations. The goals of the United Nations were not laudable. The attempted practices only 
sullied these intentions further. “Justice is indivisible and peace is indivisible,” as Mostafa Bey 
of Egypt noted in late 1951.474 And yet, the United Nations managed to divide both in Jerusalem. 
Despite setting out for mediation, the United Nations never wanted real consultation. 
Instead, what the international organization pined for was an acceptance of its mandate and a 
peaceful transfer from the British empire and the League of Nations to this new international 
construct of imperial being. The use of the term conciliation in the PCC’s name was as much for 
dampening hostilities between Palestinians, Arabs and Israelis as it was for decreasing 
malevolence with the United Nations’ plan to wrest sovereignty from these delegations in 
Jerusalem. As Jerusalem and the designs to internationalize the city got passed from UN arm to 
various UN arm, the same reality remained: this was solely a UN initiative.  
The internationalization of Jerusalem failed miserably and set a problematic framework 
for how the Zionist state of Israel, Palestinians, and neighbouring Arab nations conducted 
peacemaking in the proceeding decades. The United Nations attempted to have a mandate after 
the mandate system expired—a colony-like enclave in the so-called era of postcolonialism and 
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decolonialization. Internationalization failed not because any one mediator, commissioner, or 
representative shirked a task. Rather, the initiative failed because it was the purview of only one 
entity: the United Nations. The notion of imperial tutelage and continued imperial ways of being 
was not palatable in a supposed post-colonial world. No amount of brute force willed the UN 
statutes of 1949 and 1950 to be binding, or for Palestinians and Israelis to accept an international 
regime on a city. 
The United Nations inherited an ever-deteriorating international system of governance 
around the Jerusalem area. The Status Quo of the Ottoman empire operated for over a century 
and a half before the League of Nations dismantled collective cooperation for its sanctioned 
mandate in Palestine. In the League of Nations, Jerusalem found a new game: that of more 
intentional imperial aspirations. When the United Nations entered the scene, ideas transformed 
into a scheme, and the potential of international governance was fleshed out for permanence.  
 The United Nations tasked the Palestine Conciliation Commission to fashion this dream 
into the fabric of reality. Through conferences in Beirut and Lausanne, alongside separate 
meetings with individual delegations, the commission created a draft statute for the General 
Assembly. Aided through the efforts of the Jerusalem Committee, the PCC produced detailed 
instructions for the United Nations to make Jerusalem the permanent international enclave the 
organization coveted. While ultimately unsavoury for local populations, the United Nations had a 
roadmap to take it through regions previously lacking any semblance of cartography.  
 And yet, despite the draft statute of the PCC, the United Nations returned the so-called 
Jerusalem question to the General Assembly for further deliberation. What the PCC proposed 
was simply not enough authority to satisfy insatiable UN appetites. Following the PCC draft 





permanent internationalization, which again was strongly rejected by Palestinians, Arabs, and 
Zionists. Israel continued its settler-colonialism and Arab states soon discovered the dynamics 
that have plagued negotiations of the so-called peace processes since and into today.  
 No internationalization plan worked for the United Nations for two reasons. The first was 
that the organization could not agree on the level of intensity internationalization ought to take. 
Some clamoured for full and irreversible internationalization, while other member states were 
satisfied with the protection of the Holy Places. Secondly, and more damningly, was the 
unequivocal ignoring of local voices. Despite meeting with various delegations over several 
years, those conferences were done more out of obligation than consultation. Palestinian, Arab, 
and Israeli voices were collected not for advice or guidance, but so the international organization 
could say internationalization was achieved after talking to relevant delegations. What was 
missing was that, during the conferences of 1949, no one aside from the United Nations itself 
entertained the notion of internationalization with much fervour. Unable to bully the plan to 
fruition, the United Nations shuffled off its manufactured mortal coil and left a situation in 
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